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Abstract 
 
The goal of this research is to characterize the distribution and time impacts of spacecraft 
discrepancies found at the system level of integration and test, as well as understand the 
implications of those distributions and time impacts for the spacecraft enterprise as a 
whole.  If discrepancies can be better understood, they can potentially be reduced or even 
eliminated.  Reducing discrepancies will result in cycle time reduction and cost savings, 
as well as increased product quality and reliability.  All of these potential outcomes are 
indications of successful progress toward becoming a lean organization. 
Data on discrepancies at the system level of integration were gathered from spacecraft 
manufacturer databases, while interviews with key program managers and engineers 
provided perspective and insight into the data.  Results are based on 224 spacecraft 
representing at least 20 different programs or product lines, and encompassing 23,124 
discrepancies.  The spacecraft date from 1973-1999, and represent different spacecraft 
manufacturers as well as a mix of commercial and government spacecraft. 
Spacecraft discrepancies are analyzed in this work on the basis of ten categories:  the 
spacecraft mission, the spacecraft subsystem where the discrepancy occurred, the date of 
the discrepancy occurrence, the discrepancy report open duration, the immediate action 
taken to fix the discrepancy (disposition), the root cause of the discrepancy, the long-term 
corrective action prescribed to prevent the discrepancy from happening again on future 
spacecraft, the labor time spent on the discrepancy, and the cycle time lost due to the 
discrepancy.  Statistical measures of central tendency, correlation and regression are 
presented for the data as a whole population of spacecraft and by the two subpopulations 
of communications mission spacecraft and non-communications mission spacecraft.  This 
statistical analysis forms the basis for research findings at the enterprise level that 
indicate the state of long-term organizational learning and improvement from test 
discrepancies in the spacecraft industry.  Recommendations to enterprise stakeholders for 
increasing the value derived from system-level integration and test follow from the 
enterprise-level findings. 
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Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
Setting the Stage 
1.1.   Overview of Monograph 
The goal of this monograph is to present the results of the Lean Aerospace Initiative 
research into characterizing the distribution and flow time of spacecraft discrepancies at 
the system level of integration and test, and understand the implication of those 
discrepancies for the enterprise as a whole. 
Chapter 1 introduces the issues and gives an overview of the methodology and findings 
of the research.  Chapter 2 explains the spacecraft development and testing process, and 
presents a value stream analysis for test.  Chapter 3 contains a detailed methodology and 
analysis approach for the discrepancy distribution research.  Chapter 4 presents the 
central tendency analysis results for the discrepancy distribution research.  Chapter 5 
presents the correlation relationship analysis for the discrepancy distribution research.  
Chapter 6 discusses the methodology and analysis results for the discrepancy flow time 
research.  Chapter 7 concludes the monograph with recommendations on how to 
effectively use integration and test in creating a lean enterprise. 
1.2.   Background: The Lean Paradigm 
This background section summarizes the origins of lean and the Lean Aerospace 
Initiative.  It then discusses the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) and how this research on 
spacecraft system-level integration and test fits into the LEM.  A further discussion of 
lean thinking and the concepts of value and value stream analysis are discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
1.2.1.   Origins of Lean 
Lean began as a manufacturing approach, and was first described in the United States in a 
book by Womack, Jones and Roos called The Machine That Changed the World.  This 
book was born out of research conducted through the International Motor Vehicle 
Program (IMVP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  IMVP applied the word 
lean to describe a revolutionary manufacturing approach in contrast to the conventional 
mass production approach.  Lean included the concepts of Total Quality Management, 
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Continuous Improvement, Integrated Product Development, and Just-In-Time inventory 
control1. 
Several years later, lean was broadened to include the entire product development process 
in a second book by Womack and Jones called Lean Thinking.  That book made the case 
that lean is more than just manufacturing.  The essence of lean was a way to specify value 
in a process or product as seen by the end user, identify and convert waste into value, and 
perform tasks more and more effectively.  Lean is thus a way to “do more and more with 
less and less” – less human effort, less inventory, less time, and less cost – “while coming 
closer and closer to providing customers with exactly what they want.”2  Numerous case 
studies in the book showed the benefits of the lean paradigm applied throughout the 
entire enterprise.  The lean paradigm continues to develop and evolve, as more and more 
industries change the way they do business through the use of lean principles.  
Application of lean to the aerospace business coalesced in the formation of the Lean 
Aerospace Initiative, a collaborative research consortium.   
1.2.2.   The Lean Aerospace Initiative 
The Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) is an active research partnership among the U.S. 
government, labor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and defense 
aerospace businesses.  Formally launched in 1993, the initial research focused on the 
aircraft sector.  Following very positive results, LAI expanded its research focus to 
include the space sector in 1998.  Work in the research partnership now involves both 
aircraft and spacecraft sectors.  This monograph focused on spacecraft system-level 
integration and test discrepancy research is the first LAI product to solely address the 
spacecraft sector. 
As a neutral broker, MIT facilitates research across different companies and fosters an 
environment of cooperative learning among competitors in the industry.  Other research 
is underway in LAI specifically geared toward the space sector, including work on 
autonomy in operations, launch range capacity modeling, and launch vehicle upgrade 
optimization. 
1.2.3.   The Lean Enterprise Model 
The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) is a key original contribution by LAI.  The LEM not 
only applies to aerospace businesses, but to other industries as well.  The LEM consists 
of Meta-principles, Enterprise principles, Enterprise metrics, Overarching practices 
(OAPs), and Enabling practices.  A graphic representation of the LEM3 structure is 
shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
                                                 
1
 Pomponi, Renata A. Control of Manufacturing Processes with MRP II:  Benefits and Barriers in the 
Defense Aerospace Industry.  MIT Master’s Thesis (TPP), February 1995.  p. 21. 
2
 Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones.  Lean Thinking.  New York:  Simon & Schuster, 1996.  p. 15. 
3
 Lean Aircraft Initiative.  “Lean Enterprise Model” (unpublished model and handbook), Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.  14 November 1996. 
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Figure 1.1:  The Lean Enterprise Model structure 
 
This spacecraft system-level integration and test discrepancy research draws upon several 
key principles in the LEM: 
• Waste Minimization – Waste should be reduced and value maximized.  Womack 
and Jones present a view of testing as a type of muda, or waste (see Section 2.4.2.   
They argue in an academic sense that if a product is truly made perfectly, no 
testing would ever be necessary, because the product was made perfectly in the 
first place.  So hence, they classify testing as muda.  Determining whether it is 
Type One or Type Two muda must be interpreted in the context of the industry in 
question.  For the television manufacturing industry, television sets roll right off 
the production line and aren’t even turned on and tested for functionality before 
they get sold to the customer.  This is because the production process assures a 
near-perfect product, and testing is thus an unnecessary expense.  But for the 
spacecraft industry, where the price of failure is too high, the technology is so 
complex and each spacecraft is unique in some way, testing is currently required 
to ensure a product that performs reliably to expectations.  Still, Womack and 
Jones’s protrayal of testing as waste defines a perfect process as an ideal to strive 
for, and when reached, testing transforms from a Type One muda to a Type Two 
muda.  But without the goal in mind, however lofty and far-term it may be, less 
progress will be made towards it. 
• Right Thing – The lean principle of “right thing” as applied to integration and test 
means that the parts delivered to the integration and test activity should be the 
right parts, the assembly and test equipment should be the right equipment, and 
the instructions and procedures should be the right ones.  A discrepancy is 
essentially a “wrong” thing.  Understanding the discrepancies will help to make 
progress towards achieving the “right thing” principle.   
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• Continuous Improvement – Continuous improvement means that an organization 
constantly seeks ways to increase its value and eliminate waste.  Active learning 
from, and correction of, mistakes is one obvious form of continuous 
improvement.  If an organization is not studying its mistakes and making changes 
based upon those studies, it is not effectively engaging in continuous 
improvement. 
1.3.   Basic Terminology 
Several key terms are used throughout this monograph.  Their definitions are presented 
here for clarity.  Other definitions will be presented elsewhere as appropriate. 
• Discrepancy – a functional or structural anomaly, which may reveal itself as a 
deviation from requirements or specifications. 
• System Integration and Test – the time from payload and bus module mate until 
spacecraft ship from the factory. 
• Spacecraft – a vehicle designed to operate in space, including both the payload 
and bus (this research does not include launch vehicles or human-rated vehicles). 
1.4.   Motivation 
As discussed above in the section on the Lean Enterprise Model, there are fundamental 
lean philosophies that motivate this research in general.  More specifically, spacecraft 
manufacturers are extremely interested in looking at spacecraft system-level integration 
and test because: 
• System-level integration and test takes substantial time and resources, and dealing 
with discrepancies is perceived as a large percentage of the integration and test 
activity. 
• The cost of fixing discrepancies is believed to increase by an order of magnitude 
with each higher level of integration.  Thus, discrepancies found at the highest 
level of system integration and test are the most costly to fix. 
If discrepancies can be better understood, then perhaps they can be reduced or even 
eliminated.  Reducing discrepancies will result in cycle time and cost savings, as well as 
increased product quality and reliability.  All of these outcomes are greatly desired on the 
part of spacecraft manufacturers and customers alike. 
1.5.   Research Goals and Approach 
Responding to the motivation described above, the goals of this research are threefold: 
• Characterize the kinds and distribution of spacecraft discrepancies at the system-
level of integration across the industry 
  Page 15 
• Estimate the labor time and flow time impacts of spacecraft discrepancies at the 
system-level of integration 
• Investigate enterprise implications of integration and testing 
The research approach utilized data gathered from spacecraft manufacturer databases to 
achieve the first goal of characterizing discrepancy distributions.  Fortunately, spacecraft 
manufacturers are typically required by contractual terms to keep records of all 
discrepancies that occur during system-level integration and test.  This creates a rich 
record of discrepancies that can be searched now with relative ease, as many spacecraft 
manufacturers have migrated their paper-based discrepancy reporting systems to 
electronic-based systems.  However, all companies do not keep their data in the same 
format, nor do they all collect all the same data, which does pose some challenges to the 
researcher. 
The research approach utilized expert interviews to achieve the second goal of estimating 
the costs of discrepancies.  Time spent by employees on discrepancies is used as a 
surrogate for cost in this research.  Currently, companies participating in this research 
reported that they did not maintain detailed enough records of the time employees spent 
on discrepancy discovery and resolution to be of use in this research.  As a result, expert 
interviews had to be conducted with people who had extensive experience in discrepancy 
discovery and resolution.  The interviewees provided estimates of the time they spend on 
discrepancies. 
A large data set was amassed, including over 23,000 discrepancies from over 200 
spacecraft representing at least 20 commercial or government programs/product lines.  
The data included a mix of different spacecraft manufacturers, and a mix of different 
mission types as well as government and commercial spacecraft.  In addition, over 50 
substantial interviews were conducted. 
Finally, statistical analysis provided insights into the central tendency behavior and 
correlation of the characteristics and costs of discrepancies across the spacecraft industry.  
This analysis led to findings at the enterprise level, and ultimately to recommendations 
for the spacecraft industry. 
1.6.   Overview of Findings 
This ambitious research is the first of its kind to examine spacecraft testing discrepancies 
from an entire enterprise perspective, and clearly further analysis and validation of the 
findings presented here will shed additional insights.  The analysis for this research was 
performed first on the entire set of spacecraft as a whole, and then again on the subsets of 
communications spacecraft and non-communications spacecraft.  Six key findings 
resulted: 
• Problems with test equipment, defined as any non-flight equipment used in 
integration and test (I&T), comprise a large percentage of discrepancies reported 
during system-level I&T.  Test equipment problems are clearly waste in the 
system-level I&T process. 
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• Test Equipment and Employee/Operator error together cause nearly half of the 
discrepancies.  Particularly on commercial spacecraft product lines, these are the 
two resources that may be reused on subsequent spacecraft to come through the 
factory.  Thus there is potential for large returns on investment in these two areas. 
• The corrective action prescribed most often is “No corrective action,” reported in 
24% of the discrepancies.   This indicates missed opportunities for improvement 
in the enterprise. 
• A significant percentage of subsystem discrepancies were discovered during 
system-level testing.  If the goal is to drive testing to the lowest level possible, 
then opportunity exists for improvement.  However, finding these subsystem 
problems at system-level test may be the most cost-effective method available, 
though no evidence has presented itself either way. 
• Cycle time and labor time impact of system-level I&T discrepancies appears 
large, but currently these metrics are not tracked in adequate detail. 
• Organizations are passing up opportunities to capitalize on problems they have 
spent significant time and resources to find. 
In summary, there appears to be inadequate long-term organizational learning and 
improvement from test discrepancies in the spacecraft industry.  Though discrepancies on 
a spacecraft in system test are rectified and the spacecraft is made fit to fly, less attention 
appears to be focused on preventing the cause of that discrepancy from occurring again 
on future spacecraft.  It also appears that various aspects of the spacecraft industry are not 
yet fully aligned with addressing and solving problems using long term, cross-program, 
enterprise-wide solutions.  Solutions optimized for the enterprise, not the program or 
spacecraft, are needed for the true long-term growth and prosperity of the enterprise. 
1.7.   Summary of Recommendations 
Out of the findings from this research, several recommendations emerge on how to make 
test a valuable enterprise enabler.  A complete discussion of these recommendations is 
presented in Chapter 7. 
• Align incentives in the broadest sense with fixing discrepancies and problems for 
the long term. 
• Establish an enterprise culture that truly values the continuous improvement 
philosophy. 
• Collect the discrepancy cost data necessary to enable cost-benefit trades on fixing 
problems upstream to prevent discrepancies from occurring downstream in 
system-level integration and test. 
• Establish an inter-organization working group to develop compatibility standards 
for discrepancy data collection to enable periodic cross-industry assessments. 
The analysis of test discrepancies should not be limited to evaluating which tests 
precipitate which kinds of problems or which tests can be eliminated.  Rather, the 
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analysis of test discrepancies in the largest sense can provide an effective indicator of 
improvement in the entire enterprise, across multiple programs and over various periods 
of time.  Lean enterprises look for information indicators that can be used beyond a single 
product development.  Analysis and use of information from spacecraft system test 
discrepancies can be a significant enabler on the journey to lean. 
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Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
Spacecraft System  
Development and Test 
2.1.   History of Spacecraft Development 
“Dreams of space flight go back well before the 1950’s.  In Russia, Konstantin 
Tsiolkovsky published the Principles of Rocket Motion in 1903.  In America, Goddard 
published his treatise on rocketing in 1919.  Both of these seem to have been inspired by 
Jules Verne and dreamed of using the rocket as a means of getting to space.”4  “On July 
29, 1955 the U.S. announced that it intended to launch a satellite during the International 
Geophysical Year set to start on July 1, 1957.  The next day, the Soviet Union announced 
that same goal.  The Soviets rushed ahead based on using the R-7 rocket that was the 
basis for their ICBM.  On August 3, they successfully fired their first ICBM.  On October 
4, 1957 the same rocket put up the Sputnik spacecraft and the world was never the same 
again.”5 
Seven years before Sputnik, the Rand Corporation issued a report that set the first U.S. 
Space Policy.  The report focused on the primary function of spacecraft as future tools of 
strategic and meteorological reconnaissance.  “On March 16, 1955 the U.S. Air Force 
established a secret program project called WS-117L to develop a strategic satellite 
system.  6…[T]he Eisenhower administration policy was to push to develop military 
reconnaissance satellites, establish the right of overflight , and minimize the amount spent 
on the military industrial complex.  The concept of being first into space was not a high 
priority for Eisenhower.  In essence the two adversaries (the U.S and the U.S.S.R.)were 
fighting two different battles.  The U.S.S.R. was fighting for prestige and recognition, the 
U.S. for objective military advantage.” 
Sputnik was a sharp slap to American pride.  But the Soviet launch did establish the 
concept of the freedom of international space that was critical to the development of a 
U.S. space program.  The response to Sputnik clearly surprised Eisenhower.  The U.S. 
                                                 
4
 Hastings, Daniel E.  “History and Policy in the Fifties”, Class notes from Space Policy Seminar, MIT 
Course 16.899, Spring 2000, p. 1. 
5
 Ibid, p. 2. 
6
 Ibid, p. 3. 
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public demanded a strong response to the Soviet’s beating the Americans to space.  Space 
then became a U.S. public priority.  NASA was formed and human space flight became 
emphasized.  However the concept of spacecraft reconnaissance did not go away.  It 
disappeared into a secret, compartmentalized world that set the pattern for the way 
unmanned spacecraft were developed for the next 30 years.7 
Spacecraft quickly evolved.  They started as small radio transmitters that weighed a few 
pounds and had little value except to prove the ability to launch objects into low earth 
orbit and communicate with them.  They soon developed into sophisticated 
reconnaissance collectors that could be two stories tall and weigh up to 5 tons.  By the 
late 1980’s, spacecraft had evolved from primarily military reconnaissance and scientific 
data collectors to an important component of the U.S. commercial telecommunications 
structure. 
From the beginning, failure of a spacecraft was not an option.  Not only are development 
costs high, but much of the technology developed is one-of-a-kind and a failure of a 
spacecraft means the mission is delayed for years.  Another factor is that there is no 
capability for launch on demand.  Launch dates are planned years in advance and if a 
spacecraft fails to be launched and operate successfully it may be years before another 
launch manifest is obtained.  These factors generated a culture where prelaunch testing of 
spacecraft takes on an importance greater than almost any other product except perhaps 
pharmaceuticals. 
Spacecraft are not developed with an eye to future production.  Except for a few specific 
cases (Global Positioning System, Iridium, and Globalstar) each spacecraft has unique 
features and is often a completely new design.  Unlike aircraft or automobiles, spacecraft 
do not go through a two-step process in which a development prototype is developed and 
tested and following that the production version is designed and built.  In spacecraft, the 
development unit is typically flown.  This adds to the pressure to develop a meaningful 
prelaunch test and verification program. 
2.2.   Spacecraft Development Process 
Though spacecraft share many product development similarities to other complex 
products, there are certain characteristics about spacecraft that make them stand apart 
from other complex products. 
• A typical lot size for spacecraft is 1.  Large lots sizes for identical spacecraft are 
considered to be around 6-8.  The largest lot size produced prior to the start of this 
research in 1999 was 77 spacecraft for the Iridium constellation. 
• Spacecraft are assembled primarily by hand, with extensive touch labor.  This 
large human-in-the-loop factor greatly increases the chances that discrepancies 
will occur during assembly, integration and test. 
• Spacecraft range in cost from about $100M up to $1B and more per spacecraft. 
                                                 
7
 Paragraph content extensively drawn from Hastings, Daniel E.  “History and Policy in the Fifties”, Class 
notes from Space Policy Seminar, MIT Course 16.899, Spring 2000. 
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• Typical order to delivery cycle spans 24-36 months for commercial programs, 24-
84+ months for a government program. 
• As contrasted with aircraft, spacecraft are operated in a “no return” environment.  
This results in risk-averse customers that usually dictate extensive testing and 
verification. 
Space systems are mainly developed using a waterfall or gated process.  User needs are 
determined and translated into a system specification.  System requirements are flowed 
down and allocated to the spacecraft.  The system architecture and preliminary design of 
the major components and their subsystems are reviewed and approved at a Preliminary 
Design Review.  At this review the requirements baseline and the functions that the 
system must perform are approved and put under configuration management.  Analyses 
showing that the design can meet requirements are an important step in the total test and 
verification process. The next major milestone or gate is the Critical Design Review.  At 
this point analysis is complete and the detailed design specifications are approved.  In 
addition, all the processes required to build the spacecraft are in place.  The test program 
is detailed with plans and procedures.  Test equipment is defined and designed as 
required. 
Generally the spacecraft bus and the payload are developed separately, often by different 
organizations.  They are not physically integrated until system-level integration and test.  
A graphic of the spacecraft development process is shown in Figure 2.1, and illustrates 
how various stages of integration proceed.  First, units that will become part of the 
finished spacecraft are assembled and tested.  These units are assembled into subsystems, 
which are also tested and reviewed.  These subsystems are then assembled onto the 
payload and bus modules.  The payload module performs the mission-specific function of 
the spacecraft, such as remote sensing, communication, position/navigation, etc.  The bus 
module performs housekeeping functions common to most all spacecraft, including 
thermal control, attitude control, etc.  Many of the major components of the bus and 
payload are procured from suppliers who in turn procure components from second and 
third tier suppliers.  Because of this, there are usually multiple PDRs and CDRs which 
build upon one another prior to the spacecraft PDR and CDR.  The payload and bus 
module are assembled and tested in parallel.  When these two modules are mated, the 
activity of system integration and test begins.  After system integration and test, the 
spacecraft is packed up and shipped from the factory to the launch site.  This research 
focuses exclusively on the final stage of product development conducted in the factory – 
the system integration and test stage. 
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Figure 2.1:  Spacecraft development cycle. 
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2.3.   Spacecraft System Tests 
The concept of lower level reviews building to higher level reviews in the development 
and design process is carried over in the test program.  This is shown in Figure 2.2.  The 
philosophy is to construct a verification program that determines how each system level 
requirement is to be verified and at what level. 
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Figure 2.2:  Generic Spacecraft Testing Flow. 
 
Often it is necessary to combine analysis results from one component with test results 
from another component to show that a system requirement is met.  Six different 
verification methods are described in Military Standard 1540, which governs the testing 
of space vehicles, and these are shown in Figure 2.3.  They are analysis, qualification test, 
acceptance test, similarity, demonstration and inspection.  The objective is to show that 
all system requirements are verified at the lowest level of analysis and test possible.  Of 
course, there are requirements that cannot be verified at the component or subsystem 
level and can only be tested during spacecraft system testing.  A major challenge of the 
systems engineering function is to ensure that the information presented both at the 
reviews and in the test planning is consistent and integrated among the many participants 
necessary to develop a complete spacecraft.  It is very expensive to fix problems when 
the spacecraft is in final integration. 
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Figure 2.3:  Methods of verification, taken from MIL-STD 1540. 
 
The actual tests, test sequences and test levels carried out at spacecraft system-level I&T 
have been the subject of much study and evaluation.  Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Aerospace Corporation and others gathered and analyzed environmental test failure data 
from spacecraft.  This was the basis for Military Standard 1540.  The latest version, 
1540C “Test Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage and Space Vehicles,” was released 
in 1982.  This document forms the basis for the current approach to spacecraft testing.  
As described in this Standard, the formal compliance tests for flight vehicle equipment 
start at the unit level of assembly and progress at each higher level of assembly until the 
entire launch system and the on-orbit system can be tested in their operational 
configurations. All of the spacecraft used in this research are tested according to this 
same basic philosophy.  They differ though in terms of specific test sequences, 
environmental exposure conditions and duration, etc. as these are tailored for each 
spacecraft based upon its requirements. 
Spacecraft system testing as prescribed in Military Standard 1540C has proven to be very 
successful in reducing the risk of on-orbit failure.  But it is expensive and time 
consuming.  In recent years, significant research has been undertaken to understand how 
to make tests more perceptive and optimize the test sequence.  The Aerospace 
Corporation has played a leading role in this research by analyzing environmental test 
failures on government and commercial spacecraft.  The NASA Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center have also been doing research 
into the physics of test failures and the ability of tests to catch specific failures.  Several 
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papers on these topics have previously been published by W. Tosney, A. Quintero, O. 
Hamberg, P. Barrett, S. Cornford, C. Larson, and A. Wallace. 
The LAI test discrepancy research presented in this monograph takes a different focus 
from previous efforts that revolved around the perceptiveness of various environmental 
exposures.  The focus of this monograph is on examining test discrepancy data to 
improve the value obtained for the enterprise from the testing activity.  This ultimately 
leads to indications of how an enterprise can improve their spacecraft development 
process from one program to the next one by eliminating waste caused by discrepancies 
found during system-level integration and test. 
2.4.   Value Stream Analysis 
Value stream analysis focuses on three key ideas of lean thinking:  value, muda (waste), 
and value stream.  It provides a way to line up actions involved in a process and 
determine which contribute value and which do not.  For spacecraft test, the chief things 
that do not contribute value are the discrepancies that occur during test and set up / break 
down or related equipment associated with each test.  However, these are the most 
difficult kind of waste to remove from the process.  Hence, this research focuses on 
characterizing discrepancies so they can be better understood and someday reduced or 
ultimately eliminated. 
2.4.1.   Value Defined 
Lean thinking begins with identifying the value of a product.  Value is defined as a 
capability provided to a customer at the right time and at an appropriate price, as defined 
by the customer.   For spacecraft, the ultimate customer is the user of the satellite.  That 
may be government or commercial entities. 
Specifically looking at a test, the capability that a test provides to the customer is 
verification and confidence that the spacecraft performs as expected.  Adding in the other 
concepts of value – right time and right cost – the definition of value in a test can be 
stated as: 
“Verification through accepted methods, in a timely manner and at the 
agreed cost, that the spacecraft performs as expected.” 
 
Though each customer may have a different degree of verification needed due to its 
particular level of risk aversion, the definition of value remains the same. 
2.4.2.   Muda Defined 
Muda, a Japanese word for waste, can be thought of as the opposite of value.  More 
specifically, it is described as “any human activity which absorbs resources but creates no 
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value.”   Taiichi Ohno, a Toyota executive, enumerated seven categories of waste 
commonly found in physical production.  These seven muda are8: 
• Defects in products 
• Overproduction of goods ahead of demand 
• Inventories of goods waiting further processing or consumption 
• Overprocessing of parts due to poor tool and product design 
• Unnecessary movement of people 
• Unnecessary transport of goods 
• Waiting for an upstream activity 
In addition, Ohno described two different types of muda.  Type One muda is those 
activities that create no value but are currently required by production technology or 
processes and so can’t be eliminated just yet.  Type Two muda is those activities that 
don’t create value as perceived by the customer and can be eliminated immediately.9 
In order to make an enterprise lean, Type Two muda is the first set of activities that 
should be eliminated, for it offers the most immediate payoff.  Once Type Two muda has 
been removed, the way is clear to attack the remaining Type One muda.  Type One muda 
typically requires more time and effort to eliminate than Type Two muda. 
2.4.3.   Value Stream Defined 
For manufacturing products, the value stream is the set of all the specific actions required 
to design, build and deliver a specific product to the customer.10   To narrow this into a 
testing framework, a test value stream would comprise all the activities required to take a 
product through a test, from test requirements definition and test plan development 
through test execution and data analysis. 
For a spacecraft test, the activities that comprise a test value stream are: 
• Develop test plan and requirements:  This includes formulating detailed testing 
procedures and determining which requirements are to be verified by test; this 
also includes determining requirements for test equipment. 
• Set up test:  This includes setting up a test area, moving the spacecraft to the test 
area, instrumenting the spacecraft for test, configuring test equipment, etc. 
• Run test, take data:  This includes establishing any environmental conditions, 
putting the spacecraft through cycling required for the test, any test data gathering 
activity, etc. 
                                                 
8
 Ohno, Taiichi.  The Toyota Production System:  Beyond Large Scale Production.  Oregon: Productivity 
Press, 1988.  pp. 19-20. 
9
 Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones.  Lean Thinking.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.  p. 38. 
10
 Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones.  Lean Thinking.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.  p. 311. 
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• Take down test:  This includes removing test instrumentation from the 
spacecraft, moving the spacecraft off the test platform, returning the test chamber 
to some nominal condition, etc. 
• Analyze data, verify requirements met:  This includes all data processing and 
analysis required to determine that the spacecraft performed in the test as 
expected. 
In addition, discrepancies frequently occur during testing.  These situations introduce 
several other activities into a test value stream including: 
• Analyze discrepancy data:  This includes all data processing and analysis 
required to determine a discrepancy has occurred and identify the problem area of 
the spacecraft. 
• Determine root cause:  This includes all activities beyond identification of a 
discrepancy that are necessary to determine root cause of the discrepancy. 
• Fix discrepancy:  This includes rework needed on the spacecraft, or test 
equipment, or elsewhere to fix the discrepancy. 
• Rerun test, take data:  This may include setting up the test again either partially 
or completely, establishing needed environmental conditions, gather all test data, 
etc. 
2.4.4.   The Process of Value Stream Analysis 
With the key concepts of value, muda and value stream in mind, one can analyze the 
value stream of the spacecraft testing process.  Womack and Jones make a strong case for 
value stream analysis.  They write: “Just as activities that can’t be measured can’t be 
properly managed, the activities necessary to create and produce a specific product which 
can’t be precisely identified, analyzed, and linked together cannot be challenged, 
improved, and, eventually, perfected.”11 
Value stream analysis consists of three main steps.  Using the example of spacecraft test, 
these are: 
• Step 1:  Define the value of test to the ultimate end customer. 
• Step 2:  Identify the test value stream by creating a map of the actions required to 
take a product all the way through a test activity, from test requirements 
development to test data analysis. 
• Step 3:  Based on the definition of value, determine which actions in the value 
stream are value-added, and which are not (these are muda of one type or 
another). 
This analysis results in a mapped flow of truly value-added activities, as well as muda of 
one type or another, that comprises the testing value stream.  With a clear mapping of 
                                                 
11
 Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones.  Lean Thinking.  New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.  p. 37. 
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where both value and muda occur in the stream, a lean enterprise can begin the process of 
converting muda into value. 
2.5.   Applying Value Stream Mapping to a Spacecraft Test 
The first step in value stream analysis is defining value.  The value of spacecraft test was 
previously defined as:  “Verification through accepted methods, in a timely manner and 
at the agreed cost, that the spacecraft perform as expected.”  The definition contains three 
key elements:  verification of meeting requirements, schedule and cost. 
The second step is mapping the stream.  The activities associated with spacecraft testing 
were outlined earlier.  Figure 2.4 shows these activities assembled into a value stream 
map, which illustrates a sequential flow of actions from test plan development through 
posttest analysis of data.  The map shown is generic, and attempts to encompass most 
kinds of tests performed.  More specific value stream maps should be created by a lean 
enterprise for each type of test on each particular satellite it produces.  The more detailed 
and specific the value stream map, the more useful for identifying muda for eventual 
conversion to value.12 
The final step in value stream analysis is to examine each activity in the stream to 
determine how much value it adds to the process.  Keeping in mind the definition of 
testing value given above, three activities are found to unambiguously add value: 
• Develop test plan and requirements:  The test plan and requirements ensure that 
the appropriate test is done with determined procedures in a timely manner and 
within budget. 
• Run test, take data:  Running the test generates data critically needed for 
verifying that the spacecraft meets its design requirements. 
• Analyze data, verify requirements:  Analyzing the test data verifies that the 
spacecraft indeed performed at its expected level. 
The remaining activities in the value stream shown in Figure 2.4 do not unambiguously 
add value, considering the definition of value presented.  Thus, they represent some kind 
of muda.  Three kinds of muda are present here: 
• Muda of Waiting – While the test is being set up and taken down, the muda of 
waiting occurs.  Setting up or taking down the test equipment and the spacecraft 
does not contribute directly to adding value.  In other words, it does not positively 
contribute to any of the three elements of the value definition:  verification, 
schedule or cost.  Put yet another way, the customer doesn’t care that the test was 
set up and taken down – the customer only cares that the expected spacecraft 
performance was verified in a timely and cost-efficient manner. 
 
                                                 
12
 For examples of creating and using value streams, see Womack and Jones; also Rother, Mike and John 
Shook.  Learning to See.  Massachusetts: The Lean Enterprise Institute, 1998. 
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Figure 2.4:  The value stream for a test. 
 
• Muda of Defects – Defects introduced into the spacecraft during the manufacture 
and assembly process create discrepancies during test.  These defects result in the 
creation of more work, specifically the activities of analyzing the discrepancy data 
and determining the root cause of the discrepancy.  It is no question that these 
activities are necessary to fix the current problem and make the spacecraft fit for 
flight.  However, if the defect were not present in the first place, these activities 
would be unnecessary, and thus are considered the muda of defects. 
• Muda of Overprocessing. – Poor manufacturing and product design result in 
defects in the spacecraft, which require further processing in the form of rework 
and retest.  The activities of fixing the discrepancy and re-running the test are 
examples of this kind of overprocessing muda in the value stream. 
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Muda can come in two types, as explained previously.  Type Two muda creates no 
perceived value for the customer and thus can be eliminated immediately.  Type One 
muda is those activities that are non-value-added but are required by the technology and 
manufacturing processes in place currently.  Thus, they can’t be eliminated just yet.  
Making a determination on Type One versus Type Two muda depends on the context of 
the situation.  It is not possible to label the generic test value stream muda shown in 
Figure 2.4 as either Type One or Type Two.  However, given a more detailed value 
stream for a specified spacecraft using specified testing facilities and processes, what 
muda is Type One and what muda is Type Two becomes obvious. 
For example, fixing discrepancies due to a new technology is mostly a Type One muda.  
Today’s technology and manufacturing processes don’t permit construction of a defect-
free spacecraft.  Thus defects are present and test discrepancies need to be remedied.  
However, it is conceivable to envision a future where the manufacturing processes are so 
improved that defects are much less common, or perhaps eliminated almost entirely. 
An example of Type Two muda would be putting the spacecraft onto a unique mounting 
platform for one test, moving it back to a transport platform to move it around the factory 
floor, and then placing the spacecraft on a different mounting platform for the next test. 
Clearly, the action of moving the spacecraft back and forth between platforms adds no 
obvious value to the product.  Significant time and human effort can likely be saved by 
reducing the number of times the spacecraft has to be transferred between platforms.  
This problem can be addressed now, with the current state of technology and processes, 
and is thus considered Type Two muda. 
2.6.   The Enterprise Testing Value Stream 
The value stream for a single test combines and interacts with the value streams of other 
tests, as well as other activities within organizations, to create the testing value stream for 
the entire enterprise.  A conceptualization of the enterprise testing value stream is shown 
in Figure 2.5. 
While individual test value streams are focused on verifying the performance of the 
current product to specifications, the larger enterprise testing value stream focuses on 
being a center of organizational learning for many different aspects of the entire 
enterprise.  From the product development system, to the manufacturing system, the 
supply chain and even the testing system itself, the enterprise testing value stream 
evaluates all of these aspects with a view to analyze test data for the improvement of the 
entire enterprise.  As an illustration, this research finds that 29% of discrepancies 
reported during system-level integration and test are related to test equipment.  This 
provides feedback on how well the organization’s testing system is functioning, and it 
shows that there is currently opportunity for improvement in this area.  A successful 
enterprise is one actively engaged in continuous improvement.  Striving to get the most 
out of the enterprise value stream signals a commitment to continuous improvement and 
puts organizations on the road to success and long-term prosperity. 
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Figure 2.5:  The enterprise testing value stream. 
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Chapter 3. 
 
 
Discrepancy Distribution Research: 
Methodology and Analysis Approach 
3.1.   Introduction 
The goal of the discrepancy distribution research is to characterize the distribution of 
various aspects of system-level integration and test (I&T) discrepancies, including 
affected subsystem, environment that precipitated the discrepancy, root cause, 
disposition, corrective action and open duration of the discrepancy.  This chapter explains 
the research design for investigating the distribution of system-level (I&T) discrepancies.  
Key questions are presented, data needs and data collection are discussed, and potential 
sources of error are listed. A brief overview of statistics used in data analysis is also 
presented.  Finally, barriers encountered in the research and ideas for enabling further 
research in this area are discussed. 
3.2.   Key Questions 
Two key questions that succinctly explain the research were formulated to help guide the 
research process.  These are: 
• What kinds of discrepancies are being found during spacecraft system-level 
integration and test? 
• What distribution, patterns and correlations exist? 
3.3.   Data Types and Collection 
To answer the key questions above, data on system-level integration and test 
discrepancies were collected from several spacecraft manufacturers engaged in system-
level I&T.  A spacecraft customer normally requires the manufacturer to maintain paper 
or electronic records of each discrepancy reported during system-level I&T.  Those 
records were the basis for obtaining the information on discrepancies required for this 
research. 
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For each discrepancy reported at the system level of integration for a particular 
spacecraft, the following information (to the extent it was available) was provided by 
participating spacecraft manufacturers based upon archived discrepancy reports they 
maintained. 
• Spacecraft pseudonym (to protect proprietary concerns, yet enable the ability to 
distinguish between spacecraft) 
• Spacecraft order in production (if the spacecraft was part of a constellation or 
block build or product line) 
• Spacecraft mission area (the primary functional mission area of the spacecraft, 
such as communications, weather, etc.) 
• Discrepancy report open date (year only) and open duration 
• Subsystem, or part of the spacecraft testing setup, the discrepancy was written 
against 
• I&T activity taking place at time of discrepancy occurrence 
• Description of the discrepant behavior observed 
• Root cause of the discrepancy 
• Immediate fix action needed to make the current spacecraft functional again (also 
called disposition) 
• Long-term corrective action that was prescribed to prevent the problem from 
happening again on future spacecraft 
To put into context and supplement the information contained in the discrepancy reports, 
interviews were also conducted with members of spacecraft I&T teams.  They were asked 
to describe the discrepancy lifecycle, from discovery through corrective action, 
explaining what happens at each step. 
3.4.   Characterization System 
Many spacecraft manufacturers use their own internal code system to record much of the 
information about discrepancies.  For example, many spacecraft manufacturers have a 
finite code list for causes of discrepancies.  Each time a discrepancy is investigated and a 
root cause determined, the root cause is assigned one of several codes describing the 
nature of the cause.  This coding, or "binning", of each root cause facilitates analysis. 
Since each spacecraft manufacturer’s code was different, it was necessary to create a 
master code scheme, or characterization system, into which to map the company-specific 
codes.  This characterization system is derived from existing spacecraft manufacturer 
codes, DoD military standards documents, and interagency working group products.  The 
master code scheme was limited in granularity by the individual companies’ internal code 
schemes.  For example, if Company A used only eight categories in their code for cause, 
the master code scheme for this research was necessarily restricted to a maximum of 
eight categories for cause.  Every effort was made to maintain as many separate 
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categories in the master code scheme as possible.  However if Company A combined 
cause codes X and Y into one category, the master code scheme would have to require 
causes X and Y to be grouped together in one category. 
Spacecraft manufacturers were provided with a description of the characterization system 
and asked to map their own codes into it.  The spacecraft manufacturer mapping was then 
reviewed with the researchers for potential interpretation issues to ensure the best 
mapping possible of individual company codes to the master characterization system. 
The characterization system is divided into six areas:  Mission Area Categories, Activity 
or Test Categories, Subsystem Categories, Disposition Categories, Root Cause 
Categories, and Corrective Action Categories.  These six areas are each broken down into 
several bins to describe subcategories of the data.  These are each described in detail 
below, and summarized in Figure 3.1.   
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Figure 3.1:  Graphical representation of categorization system of test discrepancy data. 
 
3.4.1.   Mission Area Categories 
These categories describe the primary mission area of the spacecraft on which the 
discrepancy occurs.  The bins are: 
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• Communications (Comm) – any spacecraft whose primary mission is to provide 
communications, including direct broadcast, relay satellites, telephony, etc. 
• Other – all other missions, such as weather, remote sensing, early warning, 
navigation, etc. 
3.4.2.   Activity or Test Categories 
These categories describe the spacecraft system I&T activity that was happening at the 
time the discrepancy occurred.  The bins are: 
• Acoustic Test (Acoustic) – includes setup and post environment activities, as 
well as the acoustic test itself and immediate post-environment functional tests. 
• Vibration Test (Vibe)– includes setup and post environment activities, as well as 
the vibration test itself and immediate post-environment functional tests. 
• Acceleration Test (Acc) – includes setup and post environment activities, as well 
as the acceleration test itself and immediate post-environment functional tests. 
• Shock Test (Shock) – includes setup and post environment activities, as well as 
the shock test itself and immediate post-environment functional tests. 
• Thermal Vacuum Test (TV) – includes setup and post environment activities, as 
well as the thermal vacuum test itself and immediate post-environment functional 
tests. 
• Thermal Cycling Test (TC) – includes setup and post environment activities, as 
well as the thermal cycling test itself and immediate post-environment functional 
tests. 
• Ambient Integration and Test Activities (Ambient) – Any activity taking place 
from payload and bus mate up to spacecraft ship that is accomplished in an 
ambient environment and not included in the categories above.  This includes 
initial and final functional tests, as well as other functional tests not associated 
with environmental exposure. 
3.4.3.   Subsystem Categories 
These categories describe the subsystem or part of the spacecraft that the discrepancy was 
written against.13  The bins are: 
• Electrical Power and Distribution Subsystem (EPDS) – EPDS’s primary 
function includes the generation or collection through solar panels, regulation, 
storage and distribution of electrical/electronic power throughout the vehicle.  
Other names: Electrical Power System (EPS), Power Subsystems, Power.  
                                                 
13
 Many subsystem category descriptions taken from Quintero, A. H.  Space Vehicle Anomaly Reporting 
System (SVARS) Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) Template.  California:  The Aerospace Corporation, 
1996.  p. 26. 
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• Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) – The GN&C’s primary function 
provides determination and control of orbit and attitude, plus pointing of 
spacecraft and appendages.  Other names: Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS), 
Attitude Determination and Control Subsystem (ADCS).  
• Payload – The Payload subsystem’s primary function provides mission specific 
capabilities to the space vehicles’ functionality.  Payloads have various 
capabilities such as communication, navigation, science, imaging, radar, and 
others.  
• Propulsion (Prop) – The Propulsion subsystem’s primary function provides 
thrust to adjust orbit and attitude, and to manage angular momentum.  Other 
names: Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS).  
• Structures and Mechanisms Subsystem (SMS) – The SMS’s primary function 
provides support structure, booster adaptation, and moving parts.  Other names: 
Structural, Structures and Mechanisms.  
• Combined Data Management Subsystem and Telemetry, Tracking and 
Command (DMS/TTC) – The DMS’s primary function distributes commands 
and accumulates, stores, and formats data from the spacecraft and payload.  Other 
names for the DMS: Command and Data Handling (C&DH), Spacecraft 
Computer System, Spacecraft Processor.  The TT&C’s primary function provides 
communications with ground and other spacecraft.  A basic subsystem consists of 
receivers, transmitters, and wide-angle antennas.  Uplink data consists of 
commands and ranging tones while downlink data consists of status telemetry, 
ranging tones, and may include payload data.  Other names: Communication 
subsystem.  [These subsystems were combined because not all spacecraft 
manufacturer data made a distinction between the two.] 
• Thermal – The Thermal Control subsystem maintains equipment within allowed 
temperature range.  Other names: TCS, Environmental Control Subsystem (ECS).  
• Wiring and Cabling (Harness) – Wiring (harness) and cabling that is not 
considered part of a particular subsystem called out above. 
• Equipment – Test equipment or ground support equipment of any type. 
• Other – Discrepancies that are traceable down to a subsystem level, but the 
subsystem does not fall into one of the above categories. 
• Spacecraft – Discrepancies that cannot be traced down to a particular subsystem 
called out above, or discrepancies that were chosen (for any reason) not to be 
traced down to a particular subsystem. 
3.4.4.   Root Cause Categories  
These categories describe the root cause of the discrepancy.  The bins are: 
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• Employee/Operator – discrepancies caused by a person incorrectly executing a 
procedure, bumping an object, etc.  For example handling errors, manufacturing 
errors, operator error, workmanship, etc.  
• Design – discrepancies caused by incorrect design of spacecraft or procedures; 
includes bonding/encapsulation, drawing/layout and design characteristics.  Also 
a planned procedure executed as planned and determined to be planned 
incorrectly, etc. 
• Material – discrepancies caused by defective material, parts, etc. ON the 
spacecraft 
• Equipment – discrepancies caused by defective test equipment, GSE, etc. that is 
NOT on the spacecraft 
• Software – discrepancies caused by software, either on the spacecraft or on the 
ground equipment 
• No Anomaly – discrepancies written up in error, or determined later not to be 
anomalies, etc. 
• Unknown – discrepancies whose cause is unknown or unable to be determined, 
etc. 
• Other – discrepancies which don’t fit into the above 7 categories.  Examples 
might include, but are not limited to, unplanned events such as roof leaks or 
facility environmental control malfunction. 
3.4.5.   Disposition Categories 
These categories describe the disposition of the discrepancy, that is, the immediate action 
that is required to make the current discrepant spacecraft functional again.  Note how this 
differs from corrective action below.  The bins are: 
• Use as is – discrepancies which are dispositioned to use the anomalous item in its 
present state, not requiring any changes. 
• Rework – discrepancies which are dispositioned as rework to the original 
blueprint. 
• Repair – discrepancies which are dispositioned as repair, either standard or 
unique.  Repair leaves the spacecraft different from the original print. 
• Return to Supplier – discrepancies which are dispositioned to return the 
anomalous part to the supplier. 
• Scrap – discrepancies which are dispositioned as scrap, meaning the anomalous 
items will be thrown away because they can no longer serve their designed 
purpose. 
• Other – discrepancies which don’t fit into the above 4 categories for disposition. 
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3.4.6.   Corrective Action Categories  
These categories describe the corrective action prescribed.  A corrective action is a long-
term action that will prevent the discrepancy from occurring again on future spacecraft.  
Note how this differs from disposition above.  The bins are: 
• Operator/Employee – a corrective action involving an operator or employee; e.g. 
training, counseling, notifying supervisor. 
• Drawing or Spec – corrective action involving drawings or specifications that 
need to be changed, corrected, modified, etc. 
• Process/Procedure – Corrective action involving processes or procedures that 
need a change, certification, recertification, etc. 
• Software Change – Corrective action involving software (either on the spacecraft 
or on ground support equipment) changes, corrections, modifications, etc. 
• Equipment – corrective action involving testing, manufacturing, assembly, etc. 
equipment that needs to be repaired, replaced, recalibrated, corrected, etc. 
• Supplier-related – corrective action involving a supplier or subcontractor. 
• No Action Required – it is determined that no corrective action is needed, for 
whatever reason. 
• Other – corrective actions which don’t fit into the above 7 categories. 
3.5.   Data Profile and Validity 
Over 23,000 discrepancies from over 200 spacecraft representing at least 20 commercial 
or government programs/product lines were analyzed in this research.  The data included 
a mix of different spacecraft manufacturers, and a mix of different mission types as well.  
The mission type breakdown and the government/commercial program breakdown are 
shown below in Figure 3.2.  The data is ¾ commercial communications missions, and ¼ 
other types of government missions.  Start dates of system integration and test for the 
data ranged from 1973-1999.  A distribution of start dates is shown in Figure 3.3.  As 
seen in the figure, the bulk of the data are from 1990-1999.  
The following information was sought on each discrepancy that occurred at the system 
level of integration and test for each spacecraft: 
• Spacecraft pseudonym 
• Spacecraft order in production 
• Spacecraft mission area 
• Discrepancy report open date (year only) and open duration 
• Subsystem, or part of the spacecraft testing setup, the discrepancy was written 
against 
• I&T activity taking place at time of discrepancy occurrence 
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• Description of the discrepant behavior observed 
• Root cause of the discrepancy 
• Immediate fix action needed to make the current spacecraft functional again (also 
called disposition) 
• Long-term corrective action that was prescribed to prevent the problem from 
happening again on future spacecraft 
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Figure 3.2:  Distribution of spacecraft by mission area. 
 
However, the data obtained for some spacecraft was incomplete from the perspective of 
containing all the above information that was sought.  For example, some discrepancies 
reported did not contain information about the close date, and thus duration information 
on that discrepancy was unavailable.  If a certain category of information (such as 
duration) was unavailable for more than 50% of the discrepancies reported on a given 
spacecraft, that category was treated as missing data and not included in the analysis. 
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Figure 3.3:  Distribution of spacecraft by decade of integration and test start date. 
 
In addition, if a spacecraft manufacturer provided data for a spacecraft that they 
speculated was incomplete from the point of view of not containing all the discrepancies 
reported during system-level I&T, these spacecraft were not used in the analysis.  Several 
spacecraft manufacturers did report that, for instance, they were migrating to a new 
automated reporting system at particular points in history, and believed that certain 
spacecraft undergoing system-level I&T around that timeframe were not accurately or 
completely contained within the records provided for this research.  Hence, they were not 
used in the final analysis. 
3.6.   Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis used in this research is the spacecraft.  All data are presented for each 
category as a percentage of the total discrepancies that occurred in that category on a 
given spacecraft.  Thus, the numbers are normalized, which protects proprietary 
concerns.  It also effectively weights all spacecraft evenly regardless of the total number 
of discrepancies reported.  This is important, because the reasons behind different 
numbers of total discrepancies per spacecraft can be considered an artifact of 
organization and corporate culture.  It is important to eliminate this bias from the 
analysis. 
To get a more intuitive idea of using the spacecraft as the unit of analysis, examine 
Figure 3.4.  Figure 3.4 shows a research data sheet for a sample spacecraft.  The 
spacecraft pseudonym, order in production, mission area, and discrepancy report dates 
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Spacecraft 
Psuedonym #00136 Open Year 1989
Order in 
Production 1
Open 
Duration 67 Days
Mission Area Communications
Activity [% Discrepancies]
Acoustic Vibration Acceleration Shock
Thermal 
Vacuum
Thermal 
Cycle Ambient Other
1 0 0 0 34 5 60 0
Subsystem [% Discrpeancies]
EPDS GNC Propulsion SMS DMS/TTC Thermal Harness Equipment
5 2 5 1 0 3 0 32
Payload Spacecraft Other
31 20 1
Disposition [% Discrepancies]
Use As Is Rework Repair
Return to 
Supplier Scrap Other
45 26 24 0 0 5
Root Cause [% Discrepancies]
Operator/ 
Employee Design Material Equipment Software
No 
Anomaly Unknown Other
28 13 3 24 11 6 11 4
Corrective Action [% Discrepancies]
Operator/ 
Employee
Drawing/ 
Spec
Process/ 
Procedure Equipment Software
Supplier-
Related
No Action 
Required Other
16 9 13 19 8 1 31 3
Open Duration [% Discrepancies]
0-30 Days 31-60 Days 61-90 Days
91-120 
Days
121-150 
Days
151-180 
Days >180 Days
50 23 12 5 2 1 6
 
Figure 3.4:  Example data sheet for a notional spacecraft. 
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and duration are listed at the top.  Beneath that, the categories of Activity, Subsystem, 
Disposition (immediate fix action), Root Cause, Long-term Corrective Action, and Open 
Duration are listed.  Each of the categories contains a list of the bins they contain.  
Underneath the bin name is an entry containing the percentage of discrepancies in the 
category that occurred in that bin.  Using percentages in this way, the data is normalized 
to protect proprietary concerns. 
Future analyses could certainly be performed focusing on the discrepancy as the unit of 
analysis.  This would of course provide different insights, and could be performed to 
compare the insights gained using the discrepancy vice the spacecraft as the unit of 
analysis. 
3.7.   Overview of Statistics Terminology 
The analysis of spacecraft system-level I&T discrepancy distribution data draws upon 
statistical measures of central tendency and correlation.  The sample mean or average 
usually represents the central tendency of a population.  The correlation, or degree of 
association of two variables, tells how independent the behavior is of two variables.  
Understanding these measures of a population helps in making predictions about their 
future behavior, and is thus a necessary part of the research.  This section presents a brief 
overview of statistics terminology that will be used in this monograph.  For further 
information on statistics, see Statistics for the Social Sciences by Rand Wilcox. 
3.7.1.   Measures of Central Tendency 
Measures of central tendency are intended to represent the typical object under study.  
Specifically, central tendency refers to a central or middle point in the data being studied.  
The two measures of central tendency used in this research are the sample mean and the 
sample median. 
3.7.1.1.   Sample Mean, Sample Mean Standard Error 
The sample mean is the best-known and most-studied measure of central tendency.  The 
sample mean is equal to the sum of the measurements in a data set, divided by the 
number of measurements contained in that data set.  The sample mean is not a very 
resistant measure of central tendency, because small changes in many of the values or 
large changes in only a few values have relatively big effects on its value.14 
The sample mean standard error is used to assess the precision with which the population 
mean is estimated from the sample.  It is computed by taking the sample standard 
deviation and dividing it by the square root of the sample size.15 
                                                 
14
 Entire paragraph drawn from Wilcox, Rand R.  Statistics for the Social Sciences.  San Diego:  Academic 
Press, 1996.  p. 15. 
15
 SPSS Base 10.0 Applications Guide.  Chicago: SPSS Inc, 1999.  p. 24. 
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3.7.1.2.   95% Confidence Interval of the Sample Mean 
Sample mean standard error is used to construct a confidence interval such that 95% of 
the intervals constructed in the same way from many random samples of the same size 
will include the population mean.  The 95% confidence interval is constructed by 
computing 
Mean ± t0.975(df ) × Standard Error  
where the value of t  is found in a table of percentiles of the t  distribution, and the table is 
entered using (n-1) degrees of freedom.16 
3.7.1.3.   Sample Median 
The sample median is the middle number when all of the data in a set are put in order and 
the number of data is odd.  The sample median is the average of the two middle numbers 
when all of the data in a set are put in order and the number of data is even.  The sample 
median is a very resistant measure of central tendency, meaning that small changes in 
many of the data or large changes in only a few data have a relatively small effect on its 
value.  It is often applied as a measure of central tendency when the data set has a large 
number of outlier, or extreme, values that would significantly influence the sample mean. 
17
 
3.7.2.   Measures of Correlation 
Correlation is defined as the degree of relative correspondence between two sets of data.  
The correlation between variables X and Y, for example, can be interpreted as the ability 
to predict or explain the behavior of variable X based upon variable Y’s behavior.  
Correlation indicates a relationship between variables, but does not indicate a direction of 
causality of that relationship. 
3.7.2.1.   Spearman’s Rho 
Spearman’s Rho is one measure of association based on ranks, useful for examining 
correlation between variables that do not follow a normal distribution.  Since the data 
gathered on spacecraft discrepancies do not follow a normal distribution, Spearman’s Rho 
will be used as the measure of correlation.  Other measures of association commonly 
used are Kendall’s Tau-B and Pearson’s Gamma.  These are more commonly applied to 
variables that are normally distributed, and hence will not be used in this analysis. 
Spearman’s Rho measures the extent to which two variables have a monotonic 
relationship.  Two random variables, X and Y, are said to have a monotonic relationship 
if Y has a strictly increasing or strictly decreasing relationship with X.18 
For this research, a two-tailed significance less than 0.01 was used.  All correlation 
indicated in these analyses will have a significance less than 0.01 unless otherwise noted. 
                                                 
16
 SPSS Base 10.0 Applications Guide.  Chicago: SPSS Inc, 1999.  p. 28. 
17
 Entire paragraph drawn from Wilcox, Rand R.  Statistics for the Social Sciences.  San Diego:  Academic 
Press, 1996.  p. 14-15. 
18
 Wilcox, Rand R.  Statistics for the Social Sciences.  San Diego:  Academic Press, 1996.  p. 382. 
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3.7.2.2.   Least Squares Regression 
Least squares regression derives a linear rule or expression that predicts a variable Y 
given a variable X using an equation of the form 
01
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where Yˆ  is the predicted or fitted value, X is the given predictor value, Y  and X  are the 
means of X and Y variables respectively, and iX  and iY  are the i
th
 observations of 
variables X and Y.  Using this regression equation ensures that no other linear regression 
line will give a smaller sum of squared residuals for the data being examined.  In 
addition, this regression equation makes no assumptions about the distribution of X and 
Y. 
The coefficient of determination, or the proportion of variation among the Y value that is 
explained by a linear prediction rule involving X, assesses how well a linear regression 
equation performs.  The coefficient ranges from zero to one, with values close to one 
indicating a better fit than values closer to zero.19 
3.8.   Potential Sources of Error 
Research is always confounded with potential sources of error.  By understanding these 
possibilities, the research results in the following chapters can be viewed in the proper 
context. 
The discrepancy data used in this research is obtained from spacecraft manufacturer-
maintained records of discrepancies.  These records are accurate to the best of the 
spacecraft manufacturer’s knowledge, and were assumed to be accurate for the purpose of 
this research.  However, the initial discrepancy reports upon which the records are based 
were created by people, and are thus subject to some inaccuracies and mistakes that are 
just a fact of life in a fast-paced environment.  The data were reviewed for such mistakes, 
and inaccurate data were discarded before analysis.  As an example, several discrepancies 
were listed as having report close dates happening chronologically before report open 
dates.  Obviously, this is a mistake.  For these discrepancies, the open and close date, as 
well as the open duration, were treated as missing data for the purpose of analyses. 
Another potential source of error arises in mapping the spacecraft manufacturer-specific 
codes to the characterization system described above.  This was done with the aid of 
experts at the spacecraft manufacturer who were familiar with the their coding system.  
                                                 
19
 Entire section drawn from Wilcox, Rand R.  Statistics for the Social Sciences.  San Diego:  Academic 
Press, 1996.  p. 307-315. 
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Working with the above definition of the characterization system, they mapped their own 
codes into the characterization system.  The mapping was reviewed to minimize 
interpretation problems and reduce this as a source of error. 
3.9.   Barriers Encountered 
Proprietary concerns, lack of standardization, and incomplete data were the chief barriers 
encountered in this research. 
Proprietary concerns by spacecraft manufacturers will always be a challenge for 
researchers.  These proprietary concerns are valid ones, and can be addressed by using 
pseudonyms, normalizing results, and having spacecraft manufacturers periodically 
review the research to identify potential downstream proprietary issues.  Though the 
research may accept a somewhat lower level of fidelity as a result, this is necessary to 
accomplish any research involving real-world data.  An example of this arose in 
collecting mission area information for spacecraft used in this research.  It was originally 
requested that spacecraft manufacturers indicate that the spacecraft fell into one of six 
mission categories:  communications, early warning, navigation, space science, remote 
sensing, and weather.  However spacecraft manufacturers felt that this data, combined 
with an indication of the time period the spacecraft was being produced, would lead to a 
link between a specific spacecraft manufacturer and specific data in the research results.  
This would compromise the research participant’s anonymity and proprietary 
requirement.  A compromise was formulated that broke down mission area into only two 
categories: communications and other.  While this protected the proprietary and 
anonymity concerns, the coarser categorization prohibited investigating correlation based 
upon the six original mission area categories desired. 
A lack of standardization across spacecraft manufacturer discrepancy reporting systems 
dictated that time needed to be spent learning about and understanding each one.  In 
addition, terminology associated with discrepancy reporting systems is not standardized 
across companies, resulting in the need to create a "Rosetta Stone" of sorts for 
discrepancy reporting terminology.  This manifested itself in the characterization system 
described previously. 
Finally, incomplete discrepancy records provided a challenge in assembling a 
comprehensive, cross-company set of discrepancy information.  For many reasons, 
ranging from the records no longer existed, to a person forgot to enter certain 
information, to a spacecraft manufacturer was changing over its discrepancy reporting 
system, incomplete data was provided.  This is another reality of real-world data, and was 
dealt with by not including missing data points in the analysis. 
3.10.   Enabling Future Research 
Research into characterizing the distribution and patterns of discrepancies can be greatly 
enabled by the use of a common discrepancy reporting framework and terminology.  
While many spacecraft manufacturers have internal reporting systems that are common 
throughout their company, these are not common across spacecraft manufacturers.  A 
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cross-company discrepancy analysis is extremely time-consuming without some level of 
standardization across the industry.  
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Chapter 4. 
 
 
Discrepancy Distribution Research: 
Results of Central Tendency Analysis 
4.1.   Chapter Introduction 
Measures of central tendency are intended to represent the typical object under study.  
Specifically, central tendency refers to a central or middle point in the data being studied.  
The sample mean or average is perhaps the best-known and most-studied measure of 
central tendency, and will be the focus of this chapter.  Also well known is the sample 
median, which is the middle number when all of the data in a set are put in order.  
Understanding these tendency measures of a population helps in making predictions 
about their future behavior. 
This chapter discusses the observed sample means for several categories of system-level 
integration and test (I&T) data, including: 
• Activity – Describes the spacecraft system-level I&T activity that was taking 
place at the time the discrepancy occurred. 
• Subsystem – Describes the subsystem or part of the spacecraft or test equipment 
that the discrepancy was written against. 
• Root Cause – Describes the determined root cause of the discrepancy. 
• Disposition – Describes the immediate action that is required to make the current 
discrepant spacecraft functional again, called a disposition.  Note how this differs 
from corrective action below. 
• Corrective Action – Describes the long-term corrective action prescribed to 
prevent the discrepancy from occurring again on future spacecraft.  Note how this 
differs from disposition above. 
• Open Duration – Describes the time in days a discrepancy report remained open.  
Typically a discrepancy report is opened upon discovery of the discrepancy and 
closed upon resolution of the discrepancy and prescription of a corrective action. 
For a detailed review of the bins into which each category is subdivided, please see 
Chapter 3. 
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The observed sample means are presented first for the whole population of spacecraft 
used in this research.  Then, observed sample means for two subpopulations are 
presented: 
• Communications Spacecraft – a spacecraft whose primary mission is to provide 
communications.  This includes fixed and mobile broadcast, relay spacecraft, 
telephony, paging, and other transmission of communication services. 
• Non-Communications Spacecraft – a spacecraft whose primary mission is not 
communications, though the spacecraft may have some communications 
capability.  These spacecraft might have weather, remote sensing in the broadest 
sense, early warning, planetary or space science, etc. as their primary mission. 
Statistically significant differences between these two subpopulations are noted, and 
hypotheses about the differences are presented.  The chapter concludes by highlighting 
important analysis findings that underpin the themes of this monograph and form the 
basis for the recommendations presented in the final chapter. 
4.2.   Activity Means Analysis 
The data contained in the activity category describe the spacecraft system-level I&T 
activity or environmental test that was taking place at the time the discrepancy occurred.  
The activity category has seven bins.  For a detailed description of each of these bins, 
please see Chapter 3.  The seven bins with their short names in parentheses, are: 
• Acoustic Test (Acoustic) 
• Vibration Test (Vibe) 
• Acceleration Test (Acc) 
• Shock Test (Shock) 
• Thermal Cycling Test (TC) 
• Thermal Vacuum Test (TV) 
• Ambient Integration and Test Activities (Ambient) 
4.2.1.   All Spacecraft Activity Means 
Figure 4.1 shows the observed sample means of the seven Activity category bins for the 
set of all spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure.  On average over the entire 
population of spacecraft, the vast majority of discrepancies found in an environmental 
exposure are occurring during the thermal vacuum activity.  The thermal cycling 
environment finds about 3% of all discrepancies discovered during system-level I&T, and 
the various “shake” environments of acoustic, vibration, acceleration, and shock 
combined find less than 3% of all discrepancies discovered during system-level I&T.  
The ambient environment accounts for nearly 2/3 of all discrepancies reported at the 
system level. 
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Environmental test chambers needed to create the environmental exposures are very large 
and expensive resources for a spacecraft manufacturer to maintain.  Thus, there is great 
interest among spacecraft producers to use these resources in an effective manner.  As the 
thermal cycling and “shake” environments account for a small percentage of discrepancy 
discoveries, they would be logical targets for further tradeoff studies.  These tradeoff 
studies would examine the risks, costs and benefits of continuing the thermal cycle and 
shake environmental exposures vice eliminating those exposures in lieu of other 
countermeasures for discovering, or otherwise eliminating, the discrepancies currently 
found in those environments. 
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Figure 4.1:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per average 
spacecraft in each activity category. 
 
4.2.2.   Activity Means by Mission Area 
Figure 4.2 shows the observed sample means of the seven Activity category bins for the 
subpopulations of communications mission area spacecraft and non-communications 
mission area spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure.   
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Figure 4.2:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per average 
spacecraft in each activity category, broken out by mission area. 
 
Statistically significant differences in the means of the two subpopulations show up in the 
Thermal Vacuum and Ambient category bins.  A statistically significant difference occurs 
when the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for one population does 
not overlap with the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for the other 
population. 
The percent of discrepancies discovered during Thermal Vacuum activities is 33% for 
communications spacecraft versus 15% for non-communications spacecraft.  In addition, 
the percent of discrepancies discovered during Ambient activities is 61% for 
communications spacecraft versus 78% for non-communications spacecraft.  Interview 
data and feedback from industry reviews of this research suggest the difference in these 
two category bins may be owed to the different aspects of testing philosophies, 
sequences, and cycles employed by the two different subpopulations. 
Data were not able to be collected on test sequences for each spacecraft in the research 
data set, and thus no conclusions can be drawn about the effect of test sequence on 
discrepancy occurrence. 
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4.3.   Subsystem 
The data contained in the subsystem category describe the subsystem or part of the 
spacecraft or test equipment that the discrepancy was written against.  The subsystem 
category has eleven bins.  For a detailed description of each of these bins, please see 
Chapter 3.  The eleven bins with their short names in parentheses, are: 
• Electrical Power and Distribution Subsystem (EPDS) 
• Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC) 
• Payload 
• Propulsion (Prop) 
• Structures and Mechanisms Subsystem (SMS) 
• Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TTC) / Data Management Subsystem (DMS) 
• Thermal 
• Wiring and Cabling (Harness) 
• Equipment 
• Spacecraft  
• Other 
4.3.1.   All Spacecraft Subsystem Means 
Figure 4.3 shows the observed sample means of the eleven subsystem category bins for 
the set of all spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure.  On average over the entire 
population of spacecraft, Equipment accounts for the largest percentage of discrepancies 
written against a particular subsystem with a mean of 30%.  The payload subsystem and 
the spacecraft are the next largest percentages of discrepancies, at 17% each.  The 
remaining 36% of discrepancies are distributed between the remaining traditional 
subsystems of the spacecraft, with no single subsystem accounting for more than 9% of 
the total discrepancies. 
Figure 4.4 shows an aggregated version of Figure 4.3, displaying the distribution of 
discrepancies on an average spacecraft at the system level of integration, by aggregated 
subsystem category area the discrepancy was written against.  As shown in the graph, 
36% of the discrepancies found at system level test are written against subsystems, and 
29% of the discrepancies are written against test or support equipment.  The remaining 
35% of the discrepancies are written against system level problems. 
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Figure 4.3:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per average 
spacecraft in each subsystem category. 
 
The prevailing philosophy for spacecraft test is to drive the testing to the lowest possible 
level of integration that is able to find a specific problem.  This is based upon the notion 
that the cost of fixing discrepancies grows by an order of magnitude with each increasing 
level of integration.  This translates to a desire to find unit problems at the unit 
integration and test level, find subsystem problems at the subsystem integration and test, 
and find system problems at system integration and test level. 
If the goal is to drive testing to the lowest level possible to find a problem, then only 
system level problems are the type of problems that ideally should be discovered at the 
system level of integration and test.  Currently, subsystem and equipment problems 
account for nearly two thirds of the discrepancies found during system level I&T.  This 
provides an enterprise metric for measuring progress towards the goal of driving testing 
to the lowest level possible. 
No data were able to be collected for this research on whether or not subsystem problems 
discovered during system-level test should properly have been caught at subsystem-level 
testing.  It can be argued that finding subsystem problems at the system level of 
integration may in fact be the most cost-effective method (though no cost-benefit analysis 
has presented itself).  However, it is difficult to argue that finding test equipment 
problems at system-level integration and test is not waste in the process that should be 
eliminated.  Since a suite of test equipment, particularly for commercial satellite product 
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lines, will be reused again on subsequent spacecraft, there is a potentially large return on 
investment for addressing and remedying discrepancies associated with test equipment. 
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Figure 4.4:  Distribution of discrepancies on an average spacecraft at the system level of 
integration, by aggregated subsystem category area the discrepancy was written against. 
 
4.3.2.   Subsystem Means by Mission Area 
Figure 4.5 shows the observed sample means of the eleven Subsystem category bins for 
the subpopulations of communications mission area spacecraft and non-communications 
mission area spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure. 
Statistically significant differences in the means of the two subpopulations show up in six 
of the eleven Subsystem category bins.  A statistically significant difference occurs when 
the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for one population does not 
overlap with the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for the other 
population. 
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Figure 4.5:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per average 
spacecraft in each subsystem category, broken down by mission area. 
 
Interview data and feedback from industry reviews suggest some differences in the 
subpopulations may be owed to reuse of the same bus subsystems on communications 
spacecraft.  For example, the percent discrepancies written against the DMS/TTC 
subsystem is 7% for communications spacecraft versus 17% for non-communications 
spacecraft.  The percent discrepancies written against the Thermal subsystem is 1% for 
communications spacecraft versus 6% for non-communications spacecraft.  It is common 
for many commercial communications spacecraft to be built using the same bus, whereas 
most non-communications spacecraft each have a unique bus and do not typically reuse 
bus subsystems from spacecraft design to spacecraft design.  However, this hypothesis 
might be refuted by a further examination of the discrepancies that were attributed to 
Equipment, Payload and Spacecraft.  If commercial satellite discrepancies were placed in 
these categories out of convenience due to intense schedule delivery pressures instead of 
tracing the discrepancy to its subsystem root cause, then these category percentages may 
be artificially inflated.  If this were the case, the hypothesis that reuse of standardized 
designs and components results in less discrepancies at system test would not be 
supported. 
In addition, the difference in Thermal subsystem discrepancies may be a result of the 
different experience levels thermal designers have in different orbit geometries.  The 
communications spacecraft used in this research were all designed for geostationary 
orbits where the thermal subsystem design and implementation is perhaps most well 
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understood.  The non-communications spacecraft were designed for a variety of orbits 
including LEO, MEO, GEO and HEO.  Thermal subsystem design and implementation in 
the non-GEO orbits may not be as well understood, resulting in more discrepancies 
written against the thermal subsystem for non-communications spacecraft. 
The percent of discrepancies written against the SMS subsystem is 1% for 
communications spacecraft versus 8% for non-communications spacecraft.  This may be 
owed to non-communications spacecraft tending to have many more complex 
mechanisms and articulating parts than communications spacecraft, and hence a higher 
percentage of SMS discrepancies.  In addition, the structure and mechanisms are typically 
designed uniquely for each non-communications spacecraft while they are frequently 
reused from communications spacecraft to communication spacecraft within a company.  
This reuse and familiarity with the SMS system may also help to explain the lower 
occurrence of SMS-related discrepancies on communications spacecraft. 
The percent of total discrepancies written against the Propulsion subsystem is 5% for 
communications spacecraft versus 1% for non-communications spacecraft.  This may be 
surprising, as the propulsion subsystem can be considered a part of the bus on 
communications spacecraft.  However, it is not clear that this subsystem designs remains 
as static between communications spacecraft as other subsystem designs.  Currently, 
propulsion and the ability to station keep is the limiting factor on a commercial 
communications spacecraft’s revenue generating lifetime.  It would seem appropriate that 
the limits of propulsion systems are being pushed on commercial communications 
spacecraft to maximize their lifetimes.  This could help to explain the larger percentage 
of propulsion subsystem problems on communications spacecraft than on non-
communications spacecraft. 
Figure 4.6 shows an aggregated version of Figure 4.5, displaying the distribution of 
discrepancies on an average spacecraft at the system level of integration, by aggregated 
subsystem category area the discrepancy was written against, and broken down by 
mission area. 
The percent of discrepancies written against the subsystem level of the spacecraft is 28% 
for communications spacecraft versus 59% for non-communications spacecraft.  Non-
communications spacecraft are typically one of a kind spacecraft with subsystems 
developed uniquely for a single spacecraft, whereas commercial communications 
spacecraft are developed to have a common, reused bus and subsystems.  Thus with new 
subsystems on every spacecraft, it would be expected that non-communications 
spacecraft might have more subsystem level problems still occurring at system-level 
integration and test than commercial communications spacecraft that reuse proven and 
familiar subsystems. 
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Figure 4.6:  Distribution of discrepancies on an average spacecraft at the system level of 
integration, by aggregated subsystem category area the discrepancy was written against, 
broken down by mission area. 
 
The percent of discrepancies written against the Test Equipment is 33% for 
communications spacecraft versus 20% for non-communications spacecraft.  Most of the 
non-communications spacecraft are government contracts where the test equipment is 
funded as part of the contract, whereas most communications spacecraft in this research 
are commercial developments where test equipment is likely company-funded.  A 
possible explanatory hypothesis may be that not enough investment is being made in 
quality test equipment for commercial communications spacecraft, hence their higher 
proportion of test equipment problems.  This is very interesting to note, since test 
equipment for commercial spacecraft product lines are typically reused on subsequent 
spacecraft.  Thus there is a potentially large return on investment for addressing and 
remedying discrepancies associated with test equipment on the commercial 
communications spacecraft side. 
4.4.   Root Cause 
The data contained in the Root Cause category describe the underlying reason for 
occurrence of a discrepancy.  The Root Cause category has eight bins.  For a detailed 
description of each of these bins, please see Chapter 3.  The eight bins are: 
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• Employee/Operator 
• Design 
• Material 
• Equipment 
• Software 
• No Anomaly 
• Unknown  
• Other 
4.4.1.   All Spacecraft Root Cause Means 
Figure 4.7 shows the observed sample means of the eight Root Cause category bins for 
the set of all spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure..  The Operator/Employee 
(human error) and Design category bins account for the largest percentages of causes of 
discrepancies on an average spacecraft, with means of 27% and 25%, respectively.  An 
example of human error would be a procedure that was not carried out as written, or a 
component that was installed not according to specifications.  Design problems include 
the design of both hardware and processes.  Equipment is also a significant contributor to 
the cause of discrepancies, with a mean of 17%. 
An analysis of the root cause of problems can be quite insightful for an organization.  It 
can indicate where to spend resources to increase quality or performance.  As human 
error and design-related problems are reported as the leading causes of discrepancies, 
effective corrective action aligned to address these two areas would potentially yield the 
largest reduction in discrepancy occurrences.  The same workforce, as well as the same 
test support equipment in the case of most commercial satellite product lines, is reused in 
the production of subsequent spacecraft.  Fixing discrepancies that are caused by these 
things will thus yield benefits that scale with the production rate.  It is interesting to note 
that the percentage of human error-caused discrepancies per spacecraft has remained 
more stable over the past thirty years than percentages of the other root cause categories, 
based on observations of the data used in this research.  It is also perhaps interesting to 
observe that less than half of the discrepancies were related to things typically associated 
with the challenges of building sophisticated spacecraft, such as design and software 
problems. 
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Figure 4.7:  Summary chart of means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent 
discrepancies per average spacecraft in each cause category. 
 
4.4.2.   Root Cause Means by Mission Area 
Figure 4.8 shows the observed sample means of the eight Root Cause category bins for 
the subpopulations of communications mission area spacecraft and non-communications 
mission area spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure. 
Statistically significant differences in the means of the two subpopulations show up in the 
Test Equipment and Other Cause category bins.  A statistically significant difference 
occurs when the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for one population 
does not overlap with the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for the 
other population. 
The percentage of Test Equipment root cause is 20% for communications spacecraft 
versus 9% for non-communications spacecraft.  Reasons for this difference are likely 
similar to the reasons for the higher percentage of discrepancies written against test 
equipment for communications spacecraft than for non-communications spacecraft.  Most 
of the non-communications spacecraft are government contracts where the test equipment 
is funded as part of the contract, whereas most communications spacecraft in this 
research are commercial developments where test equipment is likely company-funded.  
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It may be that not enough investment is being made in quality test equipment for 
commercial communications spacecraft, hence their higher proportion of test equipment 
root causes than for non-communication spacecraft.  This is very interesting to note, since 
test equipment for commercial spacecraft product lines is typically reused on subsequent 
spacecraft.  Thus there is a potentially large return on investment for addressing and 
remedying discrepancies associated with test equipment on the commercial 
communications spacecraft side. 
The Root Cause category bin of Other is defined as a root cause that is known but doesn’t 
fit into any of the remaining seven Root Cause bins.  Examples might include, but are not 
limited to, unplanned events such as roof leaks or facility environmental control 
malfunction.  The percentage of discrepancies attributed to Other root cause is 5% for 
communications spacecraft versus 18% for non-communications spacecraft.  This implies 
that the Root Cause bins as defined in this research may not be as well suited to 
describing non-communications spacecraft discrepancies, as evidenced by the 18% non-
communications spacecraft discrepancies falling into the Other root cause bin.  The 
causes that fall into the Other category bin for non-communications spacecraft should be 
examined closely and perhaps additional category bins created that would more precisely 
define the causes of discrepancies for non-communications spacecraft.  These new, more 
precise root cause bins would help the enterprise quickly identify appropriate corrective 
actions in a more effective and focused manner. 
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Figure 4.8:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per average 
spacecraft in each cause category, broken down by mission area. 
But perhaps more interesting than the differences in the Root Cause category are the 
similarities across the two different mission areas.  Both communications and non-
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communications spacecraft are experiencing statistically the same percentages at system-
level I&T of Operator/Employee cause, Design cause, Material cause, Software cause, 
Unknown cause, and No Anomaly cause (where a discrepancy was ultimately determined 
after investigation to not be a discrepancy).  Since the Operator/Employee cause and 
Design cause are the largest single causes and together account for nearly 50% of the 
discrepancies in both communications and non-communications spacecraft, these are the 
most obvious places to focus improvement efforts.  Lessons learned in this area can 
perhaps be shared across mission area programs, since both communications and non-
communications spacecraft are affected equally by these causes, to the benefit of the 
entire enterprise. 
4.5.   Disposition 
The data contained in the disposition category describe the immediate fix action that was 
performed on a spacecraft due to a discrepancy to make only that given spacecraft 
functional again.  Note the difference between disposition, which is for the near term, and 
corrective action, which is for the long term to prevent a problem from happening again 
on a future spacecraft.  The disposition category has six bins.  For a detailed description 
of each of these bins, please see Chapter 3.  The six bins are: 
• Use as is 
• Rework 
• Repair 
• Return to Supplier 
• Scrap 
• Other 
4.5.1.   All Spacecraft Disposition Means 
Figure 4.9 shows the observed sample means of the six Disposition category bins for the 
set of all spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure.  On average over the entire 
population of spacecraft, Use As Is accounts for the largest percentage of dispositions of 
discrepancies with a mean of 39%.  Use as Is means that no immediate fix action is being 
taken on the spacecraft as a result of that discrepancy.  This can sometimes be due to 
sufficient design margin or overly stringent specifications.  The Repair and Rework 
dispositions are the next largest percentages of discrepancy dispositions, at 26% and 
23%, respectively.  It is important to note the main difference between Rework and 
Repair.  Rework indicates a change to the spacecraft that will make it resemble the 
original blueprint.  Repair indicates a change to the spacecraft that will make it different 
from the original blueprint.  For the entire population of spacecraft, it seems that roughly 
even amounts of rework and repair are taking place.  The Scrap disposition accounts for 
less than 1% of the discrepancy dispositions, as is expected for a product such as a 
spacecraft with expensive components with long procurement lead times. 
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Figure 4.9:  Summary chart of means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent 
discrepancies per average spacecraft in each disposition category. 
 
4.5.2.   Disposition Means by Mission Area 
Figure 4.10 shows the observed sample means of the six Disposition category bins for the 
subpopulations of communications mission area spacecraft and non-communications 
mission area spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure. 
Statistically significant differences in the means of the two subpopulations show up in the 
Use As Is and Rework category bins.  A statistically significant difference occurs when 
the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for one population does not 
overlap with the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for the other 
population. 
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Figure 4.10:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per 
average spacecraft in each disposition category, broken down by mission area. 
 
The percent of Use As Is dispositioned discrepancies is 45% for communications 
spacecraft versus 13% for non-communications spacecraft.  In addition, the percent of 
Rework dispositioned discrepancies is 18% for communications spacecraft and 45% for 
non-communications spacecraft.  With the exception of Return to Supplier, the other 
Disposition category bin means are statistically the same, meaning that communications 
and non-communications spacecraft are experiencing approximately equal percentage 
occurrences of Repair, Scrap and Other dispositions.  Thus it would seem that 
communications spacecraft are choosing to use their discrepancies as is the same 
percentage of time that non-communications spacecraft are choosing to rework their 
discrepancies to make the spacecraft comply with the original blueprint. 
The percent of Return to Supplier dispositioned discrepancies is 1% for communications 
spacecraft versus 8% for non-communications spacecraft.  This is an interesting 
difference to note, and may be a result of the larger team efforts with many 
subcontractors and suppliers required to execute a non-communications (typically 
government) spacecraft contract. 
4.6.   Corrective Action 
The data contained in the Corrective Action category describe the long-term corrective 
action that was prescribed to prevent the discrepancy from occurring on future spacecraft.  
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The Corrective Action category has eight bins.  For a detailed description of each of these 
bins, please see Chapter 3.  The eight bins are: 
• Operator/Employee 
• Drawing/Spec 
• Process/Procedure 
• Software Change 
• Equipment 
• Supplier-related 
• No Action Required 
• Other Corrective Action 
4.6.1.   All Spacecraft Corrective Action Means 
Figure 4.11 shows the observed sample means of the eight Corrective Action category 
bins for the set of all spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds 
on those means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure.  The No Action 
Required subcategory, with a mean of 23%, accounts for the largest percentage of 
corrective action for discrepancies on an average spacecraft.  This is troublesome because 
it appears to point out missed opportunities for improvement.  Toyota production 
philosophies say that mistakes are more valuable than gold, because they are 
opportunities for learning and improvement.  Without mistakes, it is hard to improve.  
Thus, each discrepancy, or problem, points out opportunities for improvement.  A 
measure of how well an organization is capitalizing on these opportunities is a measure of 
how an organization is learning and improving itself. 
Employee/Operator, Drawing/Spec, Process/Procedure, Software and Equipment each 
account for between 11% and 17% of corrective action for discrepancies on an average 
spacecraft.  Supplier-Related and Other corrective action each account for only a few 
percent of corrective actions for discrepancies on an average spacecraft.  In addition, it 
was found that the supplier was involved in long-term corrective action only 1 out of 3 
times per discrepancy whose root cause was traced to a supplied component.  This 
disconnect will need to be addressed in the future.  As spacecraft companies increase 
their reliance on suppliers and out-sourced parts, a close relationship with suppliers will 
become even more necessary and mutually beneficial. 
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Figure 4.11:  Summary chart of means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent 
discrepancies per average spacecraft in each corrective action category. 
 
4.6.2.   Corrective Action Means by Mission Area 
Figure 4.12 shows the observed sample means of the eight Root Cause category bins for 
the subpopulations of communications mission area spacecraft and non-communications 
mission area spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on those 
means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure. 
Statistically significant differences in the means of the two subpopulations show up in the 
Process/Procedure corrective actions and Test Equipment corrective actions.  A 
statistically significant difference occurs when the range of the confidence interval 
surrounding a mean for one population does not overlap with the range of the confidence 
interval surrounding a mean for the other population. 
The percent of discrepancies prescribed Process/Procedure corrective actions is 14% for 
communications spacecraft versus 24% for non-communications spacecraft.  The reason 
for this difference is not immediately apparent. 
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Figure 4.12:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per 
average spacecraft in each corrective action category, broken down by mission area. 
 
The percent of discrepancies prescribed Test Equipment corrective actions is 18% for 
communications spacecraft versus 7% for non-communications spacecraft.  This likely 
follows from the same type of difference between the two populations in the percent of 
Test Equipment causes.  Since test equipment cause and test equipment corrective action 
are highly correlated, it would be expected that there would be similar proportions of test 
equipment corrective actions as test equipment causes. 
But perhaps more interesting than the differences in the Corrective Action category are 
the similarities across the two different mission areas.  Both communications and non-
communications spacecraft are experiencing statistically the same percentages at system-
level I&T of Operator/Employee corrective action, Drawing/Spec corrective action, 
Software corrective action, Supplier-related corrective action, Other corrective action, 
and No Corrective Action Required. 
4.7.   Open Duration 
The data contained in the Open Duration category describe the time in days a discrepancy 
report remained open.  Typically a discrepancy report is opened upon discovery of the 
discrepancy and closed upon resolution of the discrepancy and prescription of a 
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corrective action.  This open duration is not, however, an indication of the total labor 
hours that are spent on discrepancies.  The Open Duration category has seven bins.  The 
seven bins roughly correspond to months: 
• 0-30 Days 
• 31-60 Days 
• 61-90 Days 
• 91-120 Days 
• 121-150 Days 
• 151-180 Days 
• Greater than 180 Days 
4.7.1.   All Spacecraft Open Duration Means 
Figure 4.13 shows the observed sample means of the seven Open Duration category bins 
for the set of all spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower bounds on 
those means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure.  The 0-30 days 
subcategory, with a mean of 43%, accounts for the largest percentage of open durations 
for discrepancies on an average spacecraft.  As the category bins get longer in duration, 
the percentages of discrepancies in the bins drop exponentially.  Discrepancies open for 
greater than 180 days account for 12% of discrepancies at the system level of integration 
on an average spacecraft. 
4.7.2.   Open Duration Means by Mission Area 
Figure 4.14 shows the observed sample means of the seven Open Duration category bins 
for the subpopulations of communications mission area spacecraft and non-
communications mission area spacecraft.  The 95% confidence interval upper and lower 
bounds on those means, as well as the medians, are also shown in the figure. 
Statistically significant differences in the means of the two subpopulations show up in the 
0-30 Days bin and the Greater than 180 Days bin.  A statistically significant difference 
occurs when the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for one population 
does not overlap with the range of the confidence interval surrounding a mean for the 
other population. 
The percent of discrepancies open 0-30 Days is 47% for communications spacecraft 
versus 29% for non-communication spacecraft.  In addition, the percent of discrepancies 
open greater that 180 days is 10% for communications spacecraft versus 20% for non-
communications spacecraft.  The remaining Open Duration bins have statistically the 
same means for both subpopulations.  Though the open duration is not a direct indication 
of how much time is spent on a discrepancy, an open discrepancy indicates that the 
spacecraft is not ready to be launched yet.  Thus, long open durations do indicate 
potential delays in the delivery process and are important to monitor.  The difference seen  
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Figure 4.13:  Summary chart of means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent 
discrepancies per average spacecraft in each open duration category. 
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Figure 4.14:  Means, confidence intervals, and medians for percent discrepancies per 
average spacecraft in each open duration category, broken down by mission area. 
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here between the two subpopulations may be proportional to the system-level I&T cycle 
times in each subpopulation.  Since communication spacecraft system-level I&T cycle 
times are typically shorter than non-communications spacecraft, it may be expected that 
open durations would be somewhat proportional.  Hence, the open durations for 
communications spacecraft should be shorter on average and are observed as such. 
4.8.   Conclusions 
Analyzing the behavior of various aspects of discrepancies such as root cause, 
disposition, corrective action, and others used in this research can provide valuable 
insight for an enterprise.  System test provides a learning opportunity for the organization 
and a chance to receive feedback on many aspects of the product development process, 
such as design and manufacturing.  When enterprises learn and improve for the long term 
from the test activities, they increase value they derive from test activities. 
The analyses of central tendency for spacecraft system-level I&T discrepancies 
demonstrate several key points. 
• Problems with test equipment, defined as any non-flight equipment used in 
integration and test (I&T), comprise a large percentage of discrepancies reported 
during system-level I&T.  Test equipment problems are clearly waste in the 
system-level I&T process. 
• Test Equipment and Employee/Operator error together cause nearly half of the 
discrepancies.  Particularly on commercial spacecraft product lines, these are the 
two resources that may be reused on subsequent spacecraft to come through the 
factory.  Thus there is potential for large returns on investment in these two areas. 
• The corrective action prescribed most often is “No corrective action,” reported in 
24% of the discrepancies.   This indicates missed opportunities for improvement 
in the enterprise. 
• A significant percentage of subsystem discrepancies were discovered during 
system-level testing.  If the goal is to drive testing to the lowest level possible, 
then opportunity exists for improvement.  However, finding these problems at 
system-level test may be the most cost-effective method available, though no 
evidence has presented itself either way. 
In summary, it appears that various aspects of the spacecraft industry are not yet aligned 
with addressing and solving problems using long term, cross-program, enterprise-wide 
solutions.  Solutions optimized for the enterprise, not the program or spacecraft, are 
needed for long-term growth and prosperity of the enterprise. 
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Chapter 5. 
 
 
Discrepancy Distribution Research: 
Results of Correlation Analysis 
5.1.   Chapter Introduction 
The correlation, or degree of association of two variables, tells how independent the 
behavior is of those two variables.  Thus, correlation is defined as the degree of relative 
correspondence between two sets of data.  The correlation between variables X and Y, for 
example, can be interpreted as the ability to predict or explain the behavior of variable X 
based upon variable Y’s behavior.  It is important to note that correlation indicates a 
relationship between variables, but does not indicate a direction of causality of that 
relationship.  It is also important to note that this chapter examines the correlation of 
aggregated data, and not the correlation of individual data points.  Such individual data 
point correlation analysis is very time-intensive, and due to schedule constraints, was not 
performed in this research.  However, such analysis would be a valuable follow-on 
activity to provide validation and additional insights into the aggregated data analysis 
present here. 
This chapter explores the relationships observed between various affected subsystems, 
root causes, dispositions and corrective actions, and hypotheses are made about these 
relationships.  Correlation analysis, performed using Spearman’s Rho at the 0.01 or less 
level of two-tailed significance, and regression analysis form the basis for this chapter.  
Discussion of the relationships between various aspects of discrepancies are organized 
into three areas: 
• Organizational learning 
• Test Equipment relationships 
• Spacecraft relationships 
These correlation relationships are presented for the whole population of spacecraft used 
in this research, and are also contrasted with the relationships seen in two subpopulations: 
• Communications Spacecraft – a spacecraft whose primary mission is to provide 
communications.  This includes fixed and mobile broadcast, relay spacecraft, 
telephony, paging, and other transmission of communication services. 
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• Non-Communications Spacecraft – a spacecraft whose primary mission is not 
communications, though the spacecraft may have some communications 
capability.  These spacecraft might have weather, remote sensing in the broadest 
sense, early warning, planetary or space science, etc. as their primary mission.  
Statistically significant differences in the relationships between these two subpopulations 
and the whole population are noted, and hypotheses about those differences are 
presented.  The chapter concludes by highlighting important analysis findings that 
underpin the themes of this monograph and form the basis for the recommendations 
presented in the final chapter. 
5.2.   Organizational Learning 
The ability of an organization to learn from its mistakes and grow over time is a 
necessary skill for organizational survival and competitiveness in the long term.  Taiichi 
Ohno, a Toyota executive, was fond of his “Five Whys” tactic that helped to get at the 
real root of a problem and see ways to fix it from happening again.  For example, he 
might ask someone “Why did that component break?”  And they would answer, “The test 
equipment gave it the wrong command.”  Ohno would then reply with “Why did the test 
equipment give the wrong command?”  This line of questioning would then continue at 
least five iterations, after which time the real root cause of most problems was able to 
identified in such a way that the corrective action necessary to prevent the problem from 
reoccurring was easily recognizable. 
As seen in Chapter 4, 24% of discrepancies were assigned no corrective action.  From 
Ohno’s perspective, this would indicate that organizations are passing up opportunities to 
capitalize on their mistakes.  Several correlations are present in the data set that give 
further insight into the issue and current state of organizational learning in the space 
industry. 
5.2.1.   No Corrective Action Required 
There is a positive correlation between the No Action Required corrective action and the 
Use As Is disposition.  As the number of Use As Is disposition discrepancies goes up, the 
number of No Action Required corrective actions goes up.  A scatter plot of the 
correlation data is show in Figure 5.1.  No Action Required corrective actions are those 
prescribed when it is determined that no corrective action is needed.  Use As Is 
dispositions are those that use the anomalous item in its present state, not requiring any 
changes to the spacecraft.   
This relationship indicates that a Use As Is discrepancy is likely to be prescribed no long-
term corrective action.  While it is understandable why a problem where no immediate 
fix action is taken would also be assigned no long-term corrective action, this does not 
indicate that organizations are emphasizing long-term learning.  What is often missed on 
Use As Is discrepancies is that they can require significant analysis and investigation to 
reach the ultimate conclusion of “Use As Is.”  Thus, they are not always inexpensive 
discrepancies, and their reoccurrence could cost an organization time and money. 
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(a)       (b) 
Figure 5.1:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for No Action Required corrective 
action and (a) Use As Is disposition and (b) Rework disposition. 
 
There is a negative correlation between No Corrective Action required and the Rework 
disposition.  As the number of Rework disposition discrepancies goes up, the number of 
No Action Required corrective actions goes down.  A scatter plot of the correlation data 
is shown in Figure 5.1.  No Action Required corrective actions are those prescribed when 
it is determined that no corrective action is needed.  Rework dispositions are those that 
require the spacecraft to be altered to resemble the original blueprint. 
This relationship indicates that a Rework discrepancy is unlikely to be prescribed No 
Corrective Action.  This means that organizations seem to recognize that the kind of 
discrepancy that results in rework requires a corrective action for the long term.  Rework 
indicates that the original blueprint or design for the spacecraft was correct, but the 
spacecraft is currently not in compliance with the blueprint and needs to be made 
compliant.  In other words, deviations from the design in the manufactured item are 
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recognized as requiring corrective actions.  This demonstrates an area where 
organizations are learning for the long term. 
5.2.2.   Employees and Unknown Causes 
There is a positive correlation between Employee/Operator corrective actions and 
unknown root causes.  As the number of Unknown caused discrepancies goes up, the 
number of Employee/Operator corrective actions also goes up.  A scatter plot of the 
correlation data is shown in Figure 5.2.  Employee/Operator corrective actions include 
training, warnings, notifying supervisors, etc.  Unknown root causes are causes that are 
unknown or unable to be determined. 
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Figure 5.2:  Scatter plot and linear regression line for Employee/Operator corrective action 
and Unknown cause. 
 
It seems very typical that when a cause is not known, an employee would be the target of 
corrective action.  However, an investigation of other circumstances surrounding 
unknown cause discrepancies might yield insights on more effective and focused 
corrective action. 
5.3.   Test Equipment Relationships 
Test equipment is called out separately in this chapter for discussion, because there are 
many interesting correlations involving the equipment.  In many ways, the relationships 
seen with the test equipment are part of the theme of organizational learning discussed 
above.  Especially for commercial spacecraft product lines, test equipment is often reused 
on subsequent spacecraft, and hence learning and improvement for the long term in the 
area of test equipment has tremendous potential for large returns on investment.  As seen 
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in Chapter 4, test equipment accounts for nearly 30% of the discrepancies discovered in 
system-level integration and test. 
5.3.1.   Design Problems 
Correlations between test equipment and the dispositions of rework and repair indicate 
that there are design issues with test equipment.  Rework is defined as an immediate fix 
action that restores the discrepant part to its original blueprint or design.  Repair is 
defined as an immediate fix action that leaves the discrepant part different from its 
original blueprint or design.  Thus an increased amount of rework on the test equipment 
would indicate that the design of the test equipment is sound, but the equipment has 
perhaps not been manufactured to its intended design, while an increased amount of 
repair would indicate that the original design of the equipment cannot be used. 
There is a positive correlation between Repair and the Test Equipment subsystem, as well 
as between Repair and Test Equipment cause.  This means that as the number of 
discrepancies written against the Test Equipment subsystem go up, the number of Repair 
dispositions also goes up.  Also, as the number of discrepancies attributed Test 
Equipment causes goes up, the number of Repair dispositions also goes up.  A scatter plot 
of the correlation data is shown in Figure 5.3.   
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(a)       (b) 
Figure 5.3:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for Repair disposition and (a) 
Equipment cause and (b) Equipment subsystem. 
 
There is a negative correlation between Rework and the Test Equipment subsystem, as 
well as between Repair and Test Equipment cause.  This means that as the number of 
discrepancies written against the Test Equipment subsystem go up, the number of 
Rework dispositions goes down.  Also, as the number of discrepancies attributed Test 
Equipment causes goes up, the number of Rework dispositions goes down.  A scatter plot 
of the correlation data is shown in Figure 5.4.   
  Page 74 
The positive relationship with Repair and the negative relationship with Rework 
presented here indicate that the Test Equipment may suffer from systemic design 
problems.  Thus, investment in proper initial design of test equipment may help to reduce 
the number of discrepancies at system-level I&T. 
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Figure 5.4:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for Rework disposition and (a) 
Equipment cause and (b) Equipment subsystem. 
 
5.3.2.   False Alarms 
Correlations in the data with the No Anomaly cause indicate relationships that are 
responsible for “false alarms” in discrepancies.  No Anomaly discrepancies are 
discrepancies that were written up in error or determined later to not be anomalies.  False 
alarms cause time and resources to be spent on things that really aren’t problems. 
There is a positive correlation between the Test Equipment subsystem and No Anomaly 
causes.  This means that as the number of discrepancies written against the Test 
Equipment subsystem goes up, the number of discrepancies attributed No Anomaly cause 
also goes up.  A scatter plot of the correlation data is shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5:  Scatter plot and linear regression line for Equipment subsystem and No 
Anomaly cause. 
 
5.3.3.   Differences for Communications Spacecraft 
Certain stronger correlations with Test Equipment are seen in the subpopulation of 
communications mission area spacecraft.   
There is a positive correlation between the Test Equipment subsystem and Test 
Equipment cause that is slightly stronger in the communications subpopulation than in 
the spacecraft population as a whole.  This suggests that there is slightly better 
traceability from the Test Equipment subsystem directly to Test Equipment cause on 
communications spacecraft than on all spacecraft taken together. 
There is a positive correlation between the Test Equipment subsystem and Unknown 
cause that is much stronger in the communications subpopulation that in the spacecraft 
population as a whole.  This suggests that a discrepancy written against the Test 
Equipment subsystem is likely to result in an Unknown cause more for communications 
spacecraft than for all spacecraft taken together. 
5.4.   Spacecraft Relationships 
A large number of significant correlations in the discrepancy data appears between 
subsystems, causes and corrective actions for spacecraft.  The links between these areas 
for spacecraft systems are discussed here.  By understanding the links of subsystems and 
causes with corrective actions, current practices for long-term corrective action in the 
spacecraft industry can be assessed. 
5.4.1.   Drawing/Specification Corrective Actions 
The Drawing/Specification corrective action involves drawings or specifications that 
need to be changed, corrected or modified in any way.  There is a positive correlation 
between the Drawing/Specification corrective action and the following three categories: 
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(c) 
Figure 5.6:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for Drawing/Specification corrective 
action and (a) EPDS subsystem, (b) DMS/TTC subsystem, and (c) Design cause. 
 
• EPDS – The electrical power distribution subsystem on the spacecraft is 
responsible for the generation, regulation, storage and distribution of electrical 
power through the spacecraft.  As the number of discrepancies written against the 
EPDS subsystem goes up, the number of Drawing/Specification corrective actions 
also goes up. 
• DMS/TTC – The combined Data Management subsystem and Telemetry, 
Tracking and Command subsystem distributes, accumulates, stores, formats and 
communicates data from the spacecraft, payload and the ground.  As the number 
of discrepancies written against the DMS/TTC subsystem goes up, the number of 
Drawing/Specification corrective actions also goes up. 
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• Design Cause – Discrepant behavior caused by incorrect design of the spacecraft 
or processes/procedures associated with assembly and integration.  As the number 
of discrepancies attributed to Design cause goes up, the number of 
Drawing/Specification corrective actions also goes up. 
These positive correlations indicate that EPDS discrepancies, DMS/TTC discrepancies 
and Design-caused discrepancies are currently likely to be corrected for the long term 
with a drawing or specification change.  A scatter plot of the correlation data is presented 
in Figure 5.6. 
5.4.2.   Test Equipment Corrective Action 
The Test Equipment corrective action involves testing, manufacturing and assembly 
equipment that needs to be repaired, replaced, recalibrated, corrected, etc.  Equipment is 
defined as an item of hardware involved in the I&T process that is not flight equipment 
on the spacecraft.  There is a positive correlation between Test Equipment corrective 
action and discrepancies written against the Test Equipment subsystem, as well as a 
positive correlation between Test Equipment corrective actions and Test Equipment root 
causes.  The correlation is somewhat weaker for the Test Equipment subsystem, but gets 
stronger once the root cause has been traced to Test Equipment.  Scatter plots of these 
correlations are presented in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for Test Equipment corrective action 
and (a) Test Equipment subsystem, and (b) Test Equipment cause. 
 
5.4.3.   Software Corrective Action 
The Software corrective action involves software changes, corrections or modifications 
either on the spacecraft or on the test/ground support equipment.  There is a positive 
correlation between Software corrective actions and Software root causes.  Software root 
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causes are caused by software either on the spacecraft or on the test/ground support 
equipment.  This demonstrates good traceability between the software causes and 
corrective actions.  A scatter plot of the correlation is presented in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8:  Scatter plot and linear regression line for Software corrective action and 
Software cause. 
 
5.4.4.   Supplier-Related Concerns 
Correlation analysis reveals a relationship between the SMS subsystem and supplier-
related dispositions and corrective actions.  The Structures and Mechanisms subsystem 
(SMS) is responsible for providing support structure, booster adaptation, and moving 
parts for the spacecraft.  A Return to Supplier disposition involves returning the 
discrepant part to its supplier, and a Supplier-Related corrective action involves a 
supplier or subcontractor. 
There is a strong positive correlation between the SMS subsystem and Return to Supplier 
dispositions, and a weaker positive correlation between the SMS subsystem and Supplier-
Related corrective actions.  Scatter plots of the correlation are shown in Figure 5.9.  The 
difference in the correlation strength between these two relationships indicates that not 
every Return to Supplier disposition received a Supplier-Related corrective action.  This 
may be nothing alarming, but needs further investigation.  On the surface, it appears as 
though suppliers, while helping to fix immediate problems, are being left out of the long-
term corrective action loop.  Mutually trusting and beneficial relationships all along the 
supply chain are critical to an enterprise’s success, particularly on the issue of fixing 
problems. 
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Figure 5.9:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for the SMS subsystem and (a) Return 
to Supplier disposition, and (b) Supplier-Related corrective action. 
 
5.4.5.   Differences for Communications Spacecraft 
Certain stronger correlations with Employee/Operator corrective actions are seen in the 
subpopulation of communications mission area spacecraft.  The EPDS subsystem, the 
GNC subsystem and the DMS/TTC subsystem all exhibit negative correlations with 
Employee/Operator corrective action.  Employee/Operator corrective actions include 
training, warnings, notifying supervisors, etc.  The three negative correlations seen with 
the subsystems are: 
• EPDS – The electrical power distribution subsystem on the spacecraft is 
responsible for the generation, regulation, storage and distribution or electrical 
power through the spacecraft.  As the number of discrepancies written against the 
EPDS subsystem goes up, the number of Employee/Operator corrective actions 
goes down.  This correlation is much stronger in the communications 
subpopulation than in the spacecraft population as a whole. 
• DMS/TTC – The combined Data Management subsystem and Telemetry, 
Tracking and Command subsystem distributes, accumulates, stores, formats and 
communicates data from the spacecraft, payload and the ground.  As the number 
of discrepancies written against the DMS/TTC subsystem goes up, the number of 
Employee/Operator corrective actions goes down.  This correlation is slightly 
stronger in the communications subpopulation than in the spacecraft population as 
a whole. 
 
• GNC – The Guidance, Navigation and Control subsystem is responsible for 
providing determination and control of orbit and attitude, plus pointing of 
spacecraft appendages.  As the number of discrepancies written against the GNC 
subsystem goes up, the number of Employee/Operator corrective actions goes 
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down.  This correlation is slightly stronger in the communications subpopulation 
than in the spacecraft population as a whole. 
Scatter plots of these three correlations are shown in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10:  Scatter plots and linear regression lines for Employee/Operator corrective 
action and (a) EPDS subsystem, (b) DMS/TTC subsystem, and (c) GNC subsystem. 
5.5.   Conclusions 
Analyzing correlation relationships between various aspects of test discrepancies, such as 
subsystems, root cause, disposition and corrective action lead to valuable insights for the 
enterprise.  Many significant relationships with a single item, such as those examined for 
the test equipment, can indicate strong and constant trends over time.  System test 
provides a learning opportunity for the organization and a chance to receive feedback on 
many aspects of the product development process, such as design, manufacturing and 
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test.  When enterprises learn and improve for the long term from the test activities, they 
increase value they derive from test activities. 
The analyses of correlation for spacecraft system-level I&T discrepancies demonstrate 
several key points. 
• Test Equipment, defined as any non-flight equipment used in integration and test 
(I&T), exhibits many strong relationships with various discrepancy aspects, most 
notably, indicating design problems and causing discrepancy false alarms.   Test 
equipment problems are clearly waste in the system-level I&T process.  Greater 
investment and attention to test equipment would help to reduce problems. 
• No corrective action exhibits links with several immediate fix actions, giving 
insight into which kind of discrepancies are typically being prescribed corrective 
action and which are not.  This indicates which kinds of discrepancies to focus on 
to reduce the occurrence of no corrective action being prescribed. 
In summary, it appears that various aspects of the spacecraft industry are not yet aligned 
with addressing and solving problems using long term solutions.  Solutions optimized for 
the enterprise, not the program or spacecraft, are needed for long-term growth and 
prosperity of the enterprise. 
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Chapter 6. 
 
 
Discrepancy Flow Time Research: 
Methodology and Analysis Results 
6.1.   Chapter Introduction 
Discrepancies in system-level integration and test are considered to be the most costly to 
fix, in general, with respect to all other levels of integration.  Yet little published 
information exists on more precise costs of discrepancies at this level.  Further, 
companies participating in this research reported they did not maintain very detailed 
records of the time employees spent on discrepancy discovery and resolution.  It is 
difficult to evaluate the cost-benefit trades of fixing problems for the long term if the cost 
information is inadequate to perform such analysis.  For the purposes of this research, 
time (labor hours, facility hours, etc.) will be used as a surrogate for cost. 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology for investigating the cost of 
spacecraft system-level integration and test (I&T) discrepancies and presents results of 
that research.  Key questions are presented, the research methodology is introduced, and 
the interview questions and resulting data products are explained.  The results of the 
research are then summarized.  Finally, potential sources of error are listed, as well as 
barriers encountered in the research and ideas for enabling further research in this area. 
6.2.   Key Questions 
Several key questions that succinctly explain the research were formulated to help guide 
the research process.  These are: 
• How much labor time do discrepancies take? 
• How much serial flow time do discrepancies take? 
• How significant is that time? 
• Is further research into discrepancy time warranted? 
  Page 84 
6.3.   Research Methodology 
Recorded data from spacecraft manufacturers on the costs of discrepancies were initially 
sought, but this information was not available in current cost accounting structures.  This 
indicated that an alternative means of obtaining the data had to be used. 
A survey instrument and a structured interview instrument for gathering this data were 
evaluated.  A structured interview setting provided the best opportunity for obtaining 
complete and thorough data.  It permitted asking for clarifications, explaining questions 
to respondents in more detail than possible on paper, and being confident of a high 
response rate. 
Quality of information, not quantity, was stressed in the data gathering.  Thus, an expert 
interview approach was chosen over a large sample size approach because there were few 
people in any organization who had enough insight on the time spent on discrepancies to 
provide a reasonable and credible answer to the interview questions. 
Initial, unstructured interviews were set up at spacecraft manufacturer sites to see 
facilities, gather information on which product lines might be available for inclusion in 
the research and discuss which personnel would be needed for the structured interviews.  
Two spacecraft manufacturers agreed to make commercial spacecraft product lines 
available for this research. 
On return visits to those two spacecraft manufacturer sites, 1- to 1.5-hour structured 
interviews were conducted with over 50 experts, including program managers, systems 
engineers, subsystem engineers, unit engineers, I&T engineers, and quality assurance 
engineers.  The range of expert experience was chosen to include everyone who played in 
role in the discrepancy lifecycle, with a particular emphasis on non-factory floor 
personnel and non-program office personnel, such as the typically cross-program 
matrixed organization functions of system, subsystem and unit engineering.  These 
experts were asked to give their best estimate of the probability distribution of labor 
hours they and their associated staffs would spend on different types of system-level I&T 
discrepancies throughout the entire discrepancy lifecycle.  They were also asked to give a 
probability distribution of the serial flow time that gets spent on discrepancies at the 
system level of integration. 
The probability distributions produced from the interview questions were used to 
generate expected values for the time required for different types of discrepancies.  The 
different types of discrepancies had traceability to a particular feature in the discrepancy 
reports that were used in investigating the central tendency and correlation discussed in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  Thus, an expected time value could be matched up to each 
discrepancy that had actually occurred on a program, and a total discrepancy time was 
calculated for each system-level I&T discrepancy on each spacecraft. 
6.4.   Interview Questions and Products 
The three types of interviews conducted and the products drawn from them are listed 
below. 
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6.4.1.   Initial Interviews and Products 
These interviews were loosely structured and their main purpose was qualitative data 
gathering and familiarization.  They were designed to elicit descriptions of the spacecraft 
manufacturer’s organizational structure, their I&T structure and philosophy, and how 
personnel participated in system I&T and the discrepancy lifecycle.  A graphic showing 
the various stages of the discrepancy lifecycle and the personnel involved in each stage is 
shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1:  Matrix of discrepancy phases and employee involvement. 
 
6.4.2.   Structured Interviews on Labor Hours 
These interviews were designed to elicit specific responses about the probability 
distributions of labor hours spent on discrepancies.  Interviewees were told to consider all 
their associated staff, all the meetings, all the paperwork and all the analysis that goes on 
during the entire lifecycle of a discrepancy.  They were then asked to answer a question 
such as "What is the distribution of labor hours you and your staff spend on mechanical 
discrepancies over the whole lifecycle of the discrepancy?" 
6.4.3.   Structured Interviews on Serial Flow Time Hours 
These interviews were designed to elicit specific responses about the probability 
distributions of serial flow time hours spent on discrepancies.  Interviewees were asked to 
think about the total production line downtime that is associated with different kinds of 
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discrepancies, considering only the true downtime of the production line that prohibits 
the accomplishing of other tasks on the program.  They were then asked to answer a 
question such as "What is the distribution of serial flow time hours for mechanical 
discrepancies?" 
6.4.4.   Structured Interview Products 
These two types of structured interviews resulted in specific probability mass 
distributions for each type of discrepancy, reflecting the fact that there is variability in the 
time each discrepancy takes within a category.  In equation form, the function p x(xo ) is 
known as the probability mass function (PMF) for discrete random variable x, defined 
by20  
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The PMF is often presented graphically.  Figure 6.2 shows a sample probability mass 
function that resulted from the structured interviews. 
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Figure 6.2:  Graphical representation of sample probability mass function derived from 
interview data. 
                                                 
20
 Drake, Alvin W.  Fundamentals of Applied Probability Theory.  New York:  McGraw-Hill, 1988.  p. 45. 
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6.5.   Deriving Data from Interviews 
Using an expected value calculation, the expected time for a discrepancy type can be 
derived from its PMF as follows: 
Let x be a random variable, and let g(x) be a single-valued function of its argument.  
Then g(x) is a function of a random variable and is itself a random variable.  E[g(x)] is 
defined as the expectation, or expected value, of this function of random variable x, to 
be21 
 
E[g(x)] ≡ g(xo )p x(xo )
x o
∑ ≡ g(x)  
 
An example will help illustrate this.  Using the PMF displayed in Figure 6.2, for a certain 
discrepancy type, the calculation for the expected value of that discrepancy type yields 
 
Expectation =  (8 hrs)× 0.3 +  (16 hrs) × 0.6 +  (40 hrs) × 0.1 =  15.7 hours  
 
After calculating the expected time for each discrepancy type as just demonstrated, the 
expected time for both labor hours and serial flow hours was summed for all 
discrepancies occurring on each spacecraft used in this cost part of the research.  This 
produced two measures: 
• Total labor time spent on system I&T discrepancies per spacecraft 
• Total serial flow time spent on system I&T discrepancies per spacecraft 
6.6.   Results of Flow Time Analysis 
Flow time findings are discussed in two categories:  Labor time, and Cycle time.  Labor 
time refers strictly to hours that personnel spend on certain tasks.  Cycle time refers to the 
serial calendar time required to deliver the product.  Time is important because it is a 
surrogate for cost.  So far, this monograph has examined an enterprise-level picture of 
discrepancies at the system level of integration, but without an idea of the costs involved 
with those discrepancies, that picture is of questionable value to a decision-maker. 
6.6.1.   Labor Time 
As discussed above, rough order of magnitude estimates were developed of commercial 
spacecraft discrepancy cost and schedule losses per spacecraft at the system level of 
integration.  For an average commercial satellite, the total labor time spent on 
                                                 
21
 Entire paragraph drawn from Drake, Alvin W.  Fundamentals of Applied Probability Theory.  New York:  
McGraw-Hill, 1988.  p. 53. 
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discrepancies per satellite is about 12 to 13 person-years.  This figure includes anyone in 
the organization who could reasonably be determined to play a part in the discrepancy 
process – from finding the discrepancy, through investigation, root cause determination, 
making repairs, and prescribing a long-term corrective action.  This included program 
managers, system, subsystem and unit engineers, I&T personnel, and quality assurance.  
This estimate does not include the time of other people waiting that might be owed to a 
discrepancy occurrence.  It also does not include facility time such as might be incurred 
by needing to rerun a test.  Feedback from industry stakeholders indicates that these 
discounted areas might be large contributors to cost in and of themselves. 
To translate the total labor time into a rough idea of cost, the labor time in person-years is 
multiplied by a full burdened cost estimate of a person-year in the aerospace industry.  
Using a figure of $160,000 per person year in $FY0022, that equates to roughly $2M per 
satellite for discrepancy costs at the system level of integration.  This does not include the 
cost of capital due to the associated cycle time delay (cycle time delay is discussed in the 
following section), which may be large. 
To put the $2M cost of discrepancies figure into perspective, it can be compared it to an 
estimate of profit made on an average commercial communications satellite.  Taking a 
number from a widely used textbook on spacecraft design, the average communications 
satellite costs about $130M23.  If a profit margin per satellite of 15% is assumed, then the 
profit per satellite is approximately $20M.  If discrepancies were eliminated at the system 
level, and all resulting cost savings were put towards that bottom line and not passed on 
to the customer, the profit margin per satellite would be increased by 10%. 
6.6.2.   Cycle Time 
This research finds that on average, a commercial spacecraft would experience nearly 
two months of serial time delays due to discrepancies at the system level of integration.  
If the industry standard for commercial spacecraft cycles times have been 24-36 months 
in the 1990's, and the goal is to bring that down to 12-18 months in the coming decade, 
then this apparent cycle time delay will have to be addressed. 
Figure 6.3 presents a summary of flow time findings.  The labor time and cycle time 
impacts appear large, but currently these metrics are not adequately tracked to permit 
conducting cost-benefit trades on fixing problems for the long term.  Further work is 
warranted in this area, with the potential for large benefits. 
                                                 
22
 Wertz, James R. and Wiley J. Larson.  Space Mission Analysis and Design, Third Edition.  California:  
Microcosm Press, 1999.  p.  801. 
23
 Ibid  p.  808. 
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For an average commercial satellite at the
system I&T level of integration:
Average total labor time
spent on discrepancies
Average total cost for labor time
spent on discrepancies
12.67
person-years
$2.03M
Average total cycle time lost
due to discrepancies 56.2 days
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Figure 6.3:  Graphic of Labor and Cycle Time Spent on Discrepancies at the System Level 
of Integration, per Spacecraft. 
 
6.7.   Potential Sources of Error 
Since the labor and flow time data were obtained through interviews, they are subject to 
the errors inherent in interview data, namely the ability of interview subjects to accurately 
answer the questions being posed.  Clarity of the questions and the ability of the 
interviewer to communicate the correct question also come into play. 
The underreporting of socially undesirable behavior has been documented in other 
interview- and survey-based social science research efforts.24  Fixing a problem is 
considered a somewhat socially undesirable behavior for the purposes of this research.  
This is actually beneficial for the cost research on discrepancies, for it means that the 
results presented here on the labor and flow time can be viewed as a kind of lower bound 
on the actual numbers.  The actual time is likely much larger than the time reported 
through interviews.  
                                                 
24
 See Maisto, S.A et al.  “Self-Report Issues in Substance Abuse – State of the Art and Future Directions”  
Behavioral Assessment, Vol. 12, No. 1.  1990.  p. 117-134.  And also, Hays, R.D et al.  “Impact of 
Response Options and Feedback About Response:  Inconsistencies on Frequency of Alcohol Use Self-
Reports by Microcomputer”  Journal of Alcohol and Drug Education, Vol. 42, No. 2.  1997.  p. 1-18. 
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Lastly, the cost research is based on an expert interview approach instead of a large 
sample size approach because there were few people in any organization who had enough 
insight on the time spent on discrepancies to provide a reasonable and credible answer to 
the interview questions.  As such, the results of the research are dependent on the quality 
of the information provided by those experts.   
6.8.   Barriers Encountered 
Two barriers that were encountered in the course of the cost of discrepancies research 
were proprietary concerns by research participants and lack of standardization of systems 
across spacecraft manufacturers.  
Proprietary concerns by spacecraft manufacturers were a similar barrier to the cost 
research as it was to the discrepancy distribution research described in Chapter 3.  
Proprietary concerns limited the detail level and granularity of information that could be 
exchanged, and this in turn limited the ability of the interviewer and interviewees to 
communicate in an efficient manner. 
A lack of standardization across spacecraft manufacturer discrepancy reporting systems 
dictated that the interview questions had to be unique for each company participating in 
the cost of discrepancies research.  This is because the cost interview questions need to be 
linked back to the discrepancy reporting systems.  Because of the uniqueness of the 
questions to the different spacecraft manufacturers, direct comparisons between the 
companies at lower levels were very limited, and only a comparison in the aggregate 
would be possible. 
6.9.   Enabling Future Research 
Research into the cost of discrepancies can be greatly enabled by the use of a higher 
fidelity cost accounting system.  Such a system would track the people, materials, 
facilities and resources involved in the discrepancy lifecycle and keep a record of 
activities performed and time spent.  In addition, such a cost accounting system should be 
integrated with the discrepancy reporting and tracking system, to enable real-time 
analysis of both jointly.  The coupling of these two data sources can provide a powerful 
enabling tool for performing cost-benefit trades on repairs, corrective action, and 
implementing product development process improvements. 
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Chapter 7. 
 
 
System Test as an Enterprise Enabler:  
Recommendations for Increasing 
Value 
7.1.   Summary of Research Findings 
This monograph began by introducing some background on the origins of lean practices, 
the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM), and the spacecraft development process.  Motivated 
by the LEM principles of waste minimization and continuous improvement, this research 
investigated spacecraft system-level integration and test discrepancies, which are 
considered waste in the integration and test process.  If this waste could be removed, cost 
and cycle time reductions would follow, as well as quality and reliability improvements 
in the product.  An examination of the distribution and flow time of spacecraft 
discrepancies at system-level integration and test yields several key findings for the 
enterprise: 
• Problems with test equipment comprise a large percentage of the discrepancies 
reported during system-level I&T.  Test Equipment, defined as any non-flight 
equipment used in integration and test (I&T), exhibits many strong relationships 
with various discrepancy aspects, most notably, indicating design problems and 
causing discrepancy false alarms.   Test equipment problems are clearly waste in 
the system-level I&T process.  Greater investment and attention to test equipment 
would help to reduce problems. 
• Half of the system I&T problems are caused by “non-spacecraft” things, such as 
human error and test support equipment.  Especially for commercial spacecraft 
product lines, the same workforce, as well as the same test support equipment, is 
reused in the production of subsequent spacecraft.  Fixing discrepancies that are 
caused by human error and test equipment will thus yield benefits that scale with 
the production rate. 
• Cycle time and labor time impacts of system I&T discrepancies appear large, but 
currently these metrics are not tracked in adequate detail.  For spacecraft in this 
research, about 10% of the product development cycle time and 10% of the profit 
per product are spent fixing discrepancies at the system level of integration. 
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• Organizations are passing up opportunities to capitalize on problems they have 
spent significant time and money to find.  Testing is an expensive part of any 
spacecraft development program.  The high percentage of discrepancies for which 
no long-term corrective action is prescribed serves to enhance the point of missed 
opportunities.  In addition, interview data suggests that follow-through on 
prescribed long-term corrective actions tends to get overcome by more urgent and 
immediate needs. 
In summary, there appears to be inadequate long-term organizational learning and 
improvement from test discrepancies in the spacecraft industry.  Though discrepancies on 
a spacecraft in system test are rectified and the spacecraft is made fit to fly, less attention 
appears to be focused on preventing the cause of that discrepancy from occurring again 
on future spacecraft.  It also appears that various aspects of the spacecraft industry are not 
yet fully aligned with addressing and solving problems using long term, cross-program, 
enterprise-wide solutions.  Solutions optimized for the enterprise, not the program or 
spacecraft, are needed for the true long-term growth and prosperity of the enterprise. 
7.2.   Recommendations 
Significant opportunities exist to increase the value-added contribution of test across the 
entire enterprise.  Several important recommendations emerge out of this research that 
will help organizations to make progress towards that end.  A list of the Lean Enterprise 
Model (LEM) Overarching Practices (OAPs) that support each recommendation is also 
given.  Please see Chapter 1 or http://web.mit.edu/lean for more information on the Lean 
Enterprise Model. 
7.2.1.   Establish Inter-Organization Discrepancy Working Group 
An inter-organization discrepancy working group composed of spacecraft manufacturers 
and government agencies should be established.  This working group would set 
compatibility guidelines for discrepancy reporting across the spacecraft industry so that 
discrepancy data from different spacecraft manufacturers can be studied.  These 
guidelines might resemble the discrepancy data categorization system used for this 
research and presented in Chapter 3.  This categorization system does not require changes 
to individual spacecraft manufacturer reporting systems, but instead would provide a 
mapping or translation from individual company discrepancy reporting systems into a 
common industry-wide discrepancy data categorization system. 
This inter-organizational discrepancy working group could perform an industry-wide 
assessment of discrepancies on a periodic basis, bringing to light systemic problems in 
the industry that might benefit from shared pre-competitive research projects.  These pre-
competitive research projects could be sponsored by the government, cost-shared 
between government and industry, or wholly funded by industry.  In addition, a pre-
competitive R&D organization for the spacecraft industry, similar to SEMATEC for the 
semi-conductor industry, could be established in the future to execute these research 
projects. 
This recommendation is supported by the following LEM OAPs: 
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• 1:  Identify and optimize enterprise flow 
• 2:  Assure seamless information flow 
• 6:  Develop relationships based on mutual trust and commitment 
• 7:  Continuously focus on the customer 
• 9:  Maximize challenge of existing processes 
• 10:  Nurture a learning environment 
• 12:  Maximize stability in a changing environment 
7.2.2.   Align Incentives 
It is critical to align incentives, in the broadest sense and at all levels, with fixing 
problems for the long term.  Interview data suggest that the current incentive structure in 
organizations may not be entirely consistent with this, and needs some examination in 
that regard.  In particular, organizations appear to be structuring incentives that result in a 
sub-optimization of performance and profit at the program level.   Incentives should 
instead be structured to optimize performance and profit at the enterprise level. 
This recommendation is supported by the following LEM OAPs: 
• 1:  Identify and optimize enterprise flow 
• 8:  Promote lean leadership at all levels 
7.2.3.   Continuous Improvement 
Continuous improvement should be encouraged, valued and maintained as part of the 
corporate culture.  Through an attitude of continuous improvement and desire for long-
term organizational learning, the rewards of waste minimization and a lean environment 
can be achieved.  Improvement also involves a commitment to find the true root cause of 
discrepancies or problems, and implement an enterprise-wide solution to prevent them 
from reoccurring.  While many companies have already made strides along these lines, 
more support and appropriate recognition needs be given to employees at all levels that 
are eagerly trying to pursue the goals of continuous improvement.  Barriers they 
frequently encounter need to be identified and broken down.  Finally, improvements need 
to be measured and evaluated for their effectiveness. 
This recommendation is supported by the LEM principle of continuous improvement.  It 
is also supported by the following LEM OAPs: 
• 1:  Identify and optimize enterprise flow 
• 3:  Optimize capability and utilization of people 
• 7:  Continuously focus on the customer 
• 10:  Nurture a learning environment 
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7.2.4.   Collect Data and Perform Trades 
While some data is currently being tracked for discrepancies, increased data collection on 
several aspects of discrepancies would be very beneficial to an organization.  In 
particular, data on costs and cycle time delays associated with discrepancies should be 
collected in greater detail than is currently practiced.  This data then forms the basis for 
evaluating a host of cost-benefit trades on reducing waste – discrepancies – from the 
integration and test process by improving the upstream product development processes.  
Cost-benefit is a key decision criteria for both commercial and government programs, 
and proper data is required to achieve a meaningful metric.  Accounting systems will 
likely have to adapt to the new data collection requirements, and some investment will be 
required.  It is anticipated that this investment will pay for itself from savings on future 
spacecraft. 
This recommendation is supported by the following LEM OAPs: 
• 1:  Identify and optimize enterprise flow 
• 7:  Continuously focus on the customer 
• 9:  Maximize challenge of existing processes 
• 12:  Maximize stability in a changing environment 
7.3.   Concluding Remarks 
If discrepancies can be better understood, then perhaps they can be reduced or even 
eliminated.  Reducing discrepancies will result in cycle time and cost savings, as well as 
increased product quality and reliability.  This research has taken a first step towards that 
goal for the spacecraft industry by characterizing the cost and flow time impacts of 
system-level integration and test discrepancies.  Industry and government must take the 
next steps by implementing the recommendations presented above.  If these 
recommendations are implemented, it is the authors’ belief that long-term rewards can be 
reaped across the entire spacecraft enterprise, benefiting customer and spacecraft 
manufacturer alike. 
